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Abstract 
 !China’s!economic!strength!and!subsequent!rise!has!empowered!it!to!pursue!an!active!foreign!policy!in!the!last!decade.!President!Xi!has!outlined!China’s!ambitious!grand!strategy!for!development!and!transformation!of!the!Eurasian!land!mass.!Central!Asia!is!crucial!in!this!strategy,!yet!relatively!undeveloped.!China’s!Silk!Road!Economic!Belt!initiative!seeks!to!prioritise!the!region’s!economic!development!by!investing!in!infrastructural!projects.!However,!numerous!risks!have!long!plagued!the!region.!To!successfully!implement!and!evolve!the!initiative,!Chinese!decisionHmakers!need!to!anticipate!the!political!risks!and!security!threats!posed!by!great!power!rivalry,!regional!politics!among!the!Central!Asian!states,!and!terrorism.!!The!great!power!rivalry!looks!at!the!interaction!between!the!capabilities!and!motivations!of!Russia!and!the!United!States!towards!China’s!SREB.!Regionally,!the!political!risks!include!the!possibility!of!a!regime!collapse!in!one!or!more!Central!Asian!states,!interHstate!military!conflicts!and!a!violent!outbreak!of!antiHChinese!sentiment.!The!challenges!posed!by!nonHstate!actors,!such!as!religious!and!ethnic!terrorist!groups,!threaten!the!initiative’s!security.!!This!profusion!of!interdependent!factors!creates!a!high!level!of!uncertainty.!This!research!presents!three!different!scenarios!that!explore!alternative!futures!for!China’s!initiative.!The!scenarios!can!be!used!by!decisionHmakers!to!anticipate!the!most!possible!outcomes!of!the!interactions!in!Central!Asia!with!regards!to!the!SREB.!
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Introduction 
 
On the 7th of September 2013 the Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech 
entitled “Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future” at 
Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University, which introduced the important proposal to 
build the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB) with Central Asian countries1. Xi 
mentioned that the countries of the Central Asian region should ‘join hands [in] 
building a Silk Road economic belt with innovative cooperation and to make it a 
grand cause, benefiting people in the regional countries along the way’2. Xi expressed 
how this policy is a ‘foreign-policy priority’3 for China, which will not only further 
develop the relationships, development links, and investments in Central Asia, but 
also in Europe and the Middle East, to create an ambitious and seamless network of 
interconnectivity that will include the movement of high volumes of tradable goods 
and peoples across continents4. Since September 2013, Xi has gone on and expanded 
China’s “One Belt and One Road” initiative to include a new ‘maritime silk road’ that 
will partner with the land based SREB, to create an impressive and important Chinese 
grand initiative that will link a proposed 65 countries and 4.4 billion people across the 
three expansive regions of Asia, Africa and Europe 5 . China has subsequently 
supported its ambitious goals by introducing other supportive initiatives, such as the 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Silk Road Fund, which it has invested 
US$100 billion and US$40 billion respectively, and this illustrates China’s resolve in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Xi, Jinping (2013). ‘Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future’, from Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China website - 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Wu, Jianmin (2015). ‘”One Belt and One Road”, Far-reaching Initiative’, from China, U.S. Focus 
website - http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/one-belt-and-one-road-far-reaching-
initiative/  
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pursuit of its impressive national interests6. Politically, these initiatives are meant to 
follow the Chinese adopted foreign policy principles of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence and to foster a global win-win cooperation situation7, whereby 
international relations and rule of law are based upon ‘mutual coexistence’ that 
enhance “friendship and cooperation among peoples of various countries, and 
promoting world peace and development”8. 
 
This research project focuses upon China’s SREB initiative in Central Asia. Although 
the strategy is largely economic in nature, there are considerable political and security 
risks and threats that need to be accounted for the success of the strategy in the short, 
medium, and long terms. The aim of this research project is to highlight a series of 
key political risks and security threats at three levels of analysis, and subsequently 
construct three predicted scenarios based upon the potential political and security 
developments in Central Asia that would influence Chinese ambitions. The levels of 
analysis are the structural, the national, and the individual. At the structural level, the 
focused threat analysis is upon the actual or potential great power rivalry in the 
region, and the relationship between China, Russia and the United States. The 
national level risk analysis is on the political risk assessment of Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The individual level analysis 
is on non-state terrorist actors and their affect, either actual or potential, on the 
national or regional stability of Central Asia. Across the three levels of analyses an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Colquhoun, Andrew (2015). ‘China’s Silk Road plan is already taking shape’, from The Financial 
Times website - http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/04/15/chinas-silk-road-plan-is-already-taking-
shape/  
7 Xiaotang, Zhang, & Belgibayev, Marlen (2014). ‘China’s Eurasian Pivot’, from The Asan Forum (An 
Online Journal), Vol. 3, No. 2  
8 Xi, Jinping (2014). ‘Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better 
World Through Win-Win Cooperation’, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China website - http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml  
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eclectic theoretical approach9 will be applied to encompass a complete study of the 
various political and security risks and threats. The theoretical approaches include 
elements of realist power transition theory, constructivist identity and a qualitative 
country risk assessment. Each theoretical approach is elaborated upon in each section 
where applied. Additionally, all three levels are linked and have an impact upon each 
other’s developments, either positively or negatively. Once the levels have been 
analysed, three scenarios will be constructed based upon a scenario planning 
methodology to reflect the analyses and their interactions. The three scenarios will be 
the worst, the best and the most likely. Conclusively, the holistic analysis of the three 
levels and the scenarios will have indicated what is the perceived most likely political 
and security future of China’s SREB initiative. 
 
To analyse China’s initiative in Central Asia, it is necessary to understand the 
structural pressures and Chinese domestic ambitions, which make the SREB’s success 
in Central Asia a foreign policy ‘priority’ for China.  China’s grand strategy is clearly 
utilising its strengths of economic and developmental prowess to create an intricate 
global network of interconnected land and maritime trade routes, along various sea-
lanes, railway link, and highway links The Central Asian region is currently more 
significant in Chinese rationale because of the U.S. geostrategic pressure that has 
occurred on its eastern maritime borders and the U.S. ‘pivot to Asia’ policy10. China 
has reacted by making a geographically westward pivot of its own. This pivot has 
been labelled as the “Marching West” strategy, articulated by Wang Jisi, the dean of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Katzenstein, Peter J. & Sil, Rudra (2010). ‘Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: 
Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions’, in Perspectives on Politics, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 412 
10 Bader, Jeffrey A. (2014). ‘U.S. Policy: Balancing in Asia, and Rebalancing to Asia’, from The Modi-
Obama Summit: A Leadership Moment for India and the United States, pp. 13-14 Brookings Institute 
website - http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Opinions/2014/09/23-us-india-policy-
memo/23-us-policy-realancing-asia-bader.pdf?la=en   
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the School of International Studies at Peking University11. Therefore the overland 
SREB can also be characterised under this ‘Westward’ or ‘Marching West’ grand 
strategy. There are not only structural pressures that encourage China to move 
westward, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, from its domestic ambitions and 
concerns. A ‘grand strategy’ has been defined as “a set of collectively held ideas 
about how a state should pursue its long-term strategic interests by employing, 
combining, and enhancing its capabilities – military and civilian alike” 12 . 
Furthermore, a grand strategy is a combination of both foreign and domestic policies, 
because it is an illustration of a country’s core national interests, and these interests 
are determined by a number of actors within the state, who represent different ideas 
and policies and seek to enhance state power13. China has domestic ambitions to 
spread the extraordinary growth of port cities and costal provinces westwards, in 
order to alleviate concerns of poverty, underdevelopment, energy and even national 
security.  
 
To distribute wealth in China’s western regions, it has pursued it “Open up the 
West”14 policy. The goals of this policy are to develop the societies and economies of 
the interior and western regions of the PRC, because of the wealth and growth 
distribution gaps between the coastal region and the interior and western regions15. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Sun, Yun (2013). ‘Westward Ho! As America pivots east, China marches in the other direction’, 
from Foreign Policy website - http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/07/westward-ho-2/ 
12 Kennedy, Paul, Editor (1991). Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University 
Press), p. 4, & Posen, Barry P. (1984). The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 13, in Jerdén, Björn & Hagström, Linus 
(2012). ‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China, 1978-
2011’, in Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12, p. 220 
13 Kennedy, Paul, Editor (1991). Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University 
Press), pp. 2-7, in Jerdén, Björn & Hagström, Linus (2012). ‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as 
an Accommodator in the Rise of China, 1978-2011’, in Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12, p. 220 
14 Goodman, David S. G. (2004). ‘The Campaign to “Open up the West”: National, Provincial-Level 
and Local Perspectives’, in The China Quarterly, No. 178, p. 317 
15 Ibid. 
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One aspect of this policy to alleviate this concern is the investment in and the 
development of the improvement of China’s east to west railway and road links 
through the application of modern overland transportation technology across the 
difficult western terrain16. In turn this will facilitate interconnectivity and allow for 
better flows of trade, peoples and development from east to west. In terms of China’s 
grand strategy, it may be illustrated the ‘Open up the West’ has evolved from a 
domestic policy into the ‘March Westward’ strategy in Central by reviving the 
interconnectivity of the silk road through the SREB initiative. A unified link of trade 
from Europe and Central Asia will benefit not only the western regions, but alleviate 
the logistical pressures of Chinese sea freight17. This Eurasian land bridge is aiming to 
be an intricate network of light, heavy, freight and high-speed rail links, which has 
otherwise been referred to as the ‘Iron Silk Road’18. The SREB should equally 
increase the growth and prosperity of Central Asian states in the future, because they 
will be the central link within the SREB network. However, the subsequent sections 
will illustrate how the security effects of terrorism, the political risks of Central Asian 
states, and the actual or potential threat of great power rivalry in the region can affect 
the development of this Eurasian land bridge to facilitate the SREB.  
 
Another core Chinese national interest that is necessary to assist its developmental 
goals is the pursuit of a stable and sustainable energy security network. Currently 
China has identified its western regions, and in particular Xinjiang as a centre to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Garver, John W. (2006). ‘Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, 
South-west and South Asia’, in The China Quarterly, No. 185, p. 1 
17 Lin, Christina (2011). ‘China’s New Silk Road to the Mediterranean: The Eurasian Land Bridge and 
Return of Admiral Zheng He’, from Institut für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung 
(ISPSW), No. 165 (Oct, 2011), p. 4 
18 Ibid. 
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develop the energy and chemical industries19. An illustration of China’s ambitions to 
link China with Central Asian natural resource reserves is the “West to East Gas 
Transmission II”, which in 2013 was completed and spans 9,000km from 
Turkmenistan to Hong Kong, passing through 15 provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions, and carries 30 billion cubic metres to powering many cities 
along the way20. To sustain and build upon these energy links with other countries 
will enable the SREB initiative to flourish, be sustainable and even aid the 
development of the countries and their peoples along the SREB in the long term. 
However, since these pipelines are expansive and pass through many countries, it will 
be imperative for China to maintain stability in the countries and guard against the 
threat of terrorism along the routes in the future. Terrorism is a serious national 
security priority for China. This is explicit in the Xinjiang autonomous region, which 
has a population of approximately 22 million, of which 8 million are Muslim 
Uyghurs21. For decades the PRC government has viewed Xinjiang as a problematic 
autonomous region, in which the Uighurs are labelled terrorist, separatists and 
religious extremists22. Problems exist because there is a social divide between the 
Islamic practicing Uyghurs and the majority Buddhist Han population who are fearful 
of social unrest from other religions and cultural traditions23.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Chen, Wenying, Li, Hualin, & Wu, Zongxin (2010). ‘Western China energy development and west 
to east energy transfer: Application of Western China Sustainable Energy Development Model’, in 
Energy Policy, Vol. 38, p. 7108 
20 Cullen, Joe (2013). ‘Second West-East Gas Pipeline set to start Hong Kong supplies this summer’, 
from South China Morning Post website - 
http://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/technology/article/1261619/second-west-east-gas-pipeline-set-start-
hong-kong-supplies  
21 Primiano, Christopher B. (2013). ‘China under stress: The Xinjiang question’, in International 
Politics, Vol. 50, p. 455 
22 Ibid, p. 460 
23 Davis, Elizabeth Van Wie (2008). ‘Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China’, in Asian 
Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 16 
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China’s domestic and regional plans have been to integrate the region with the rest of 
China and other ethnically similar countries from Central Asia to promote a common 
prosperity of wealth and growth that will reduce ethnic tensions and create a more 
harmonious society24. However, China will need to manage and contain not only the 
spread terrorism within its own borders, but within the largely Muslim populated 
Central Asian states that share cultural, traditional and religious connections with 
Xinjiang ethnic minorities. In terms of the SREB, the rise of serious terrorist threat 
across the whole Islamic Central Asia will be detrimental for further development and 
future investment in the region to create a successful and flourishing SREB. The 
section on terrorism in Central Asia will elaborate and asses fully the extent of a 
terrorist threat to China’s westward grand strategy and indicate where China should 
focus its efforts. Overall, it is evident to see the two-level rationale for China’s grand 
strategy for an SREB going through Central Asia. Its national interests in creating the 
SREB through a westward strategy are a mix of concerns for domestic poverty, 
development, energy and national security. Therefore it is in China best interests to 
alleviate any actual or potential threats towards its grand strategy because it would 
have effect upon the outcomes of its domestic goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Yuchao, Zhu & Dongyan Blachford (2012). ‘Economic Expansion, Marketization, and Their Social 
Impact on China’s Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet’, in Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 714 
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History 
 
The historical reference of Central Asia should not be underestimated in relation to 
China’s contemporary drive westward. Although Central Asia is commonly 
associated with the geography of a specific region in the world, in this case it refers to 
the contemporary understanding of the region that is comprised of the five post-Soviet 
states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan25. The 
history of these countries in the region of Central Asia is influential and insightful to 
understand the holistic nature of the relationships between the countries themselves, 
other countries outside the region, and its significance in the global flow of trade, 
peoples and cultures. This section will seek to relate common themes and features that 
are relevant in contemporary Central Asia to its past, to identify how these features 
are not necessarily new to Central Asia. The main links to Central Asia that are 
addressed here are the links with China, the silk road, Islam, and great power rivalry. 
 
Central Asia’s links with China are significant and long. During Xi’s speech in 
Kazakhstan highlighted the long historical links between China and Central Asia that 
spanned over 2,000 years26. He mentioned that during the Han dynasty (206 BC – 24 
AD), the imperial envoy Zhang Qian was sent to Central Asia to establish good 
relations with the peoples and tribes of the region27. Xi also highlighted that the long 
historical exchanges have proved that the differences between Central Asia and China 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Clarke, Michael (2009). “The ‘centrality’ of Central Asia in the world history, 1700-2008”, in 
Mackerras, Colin & Clarke, Michael, Editors (2009). China, Xinjiang and Central Asia. History, 
transition and crossborder interaction into the 21st century (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 21 
26 Xi, Jinping (2013). ‘Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future’, from Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China website - 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml 
27 Ibid. 
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can be alleviated, and peace and development can be achieved28. Xi is primarily 
alluding to the old Silk Road that existed between China and the West that crossed the 
great steppes of Central Asia. A German traveller and geographer called Ferdinand 
von Richthofen first created the term ‘silk road’ in 187729, and he argued that the silk 
road’s great commercial and trade routes were historically and culturally significant 
after the Han dynasty, which has expanded the term ‘silk-road’ to refer to the general 
experience of trans-Eurasian exchanges30.  
 
These exchanges were not solely silk based, but incorporated many tradable goods, 
religions, ideas and peoples31. Therefore China’s new silk road can be seen as project 
to revive these great exchanges. Additionally, China should seek to revive the positive 
and accommodative features of China-Central Asia relations in the past can best be 
illustrated by the history during the Tang dynasty (618 AD – 901 AD). The Tang 
dynasty is a true example of China’s Sino-sphere or Sino-centric influence because 
China was inclusive, receptive and cosmopolitan of goods and cultures from many 
countries and regions around it32. The creation of the SREB in and through Central 
Asia will certainly replicate the various links, but also re-establish China with its past 
Sino-centric identity.  
 
In order to achieve these links, China’s autonomous region of Xinjiang will act as the 
crossroads between China and Central Asia33. In the past Xinjiang was China’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Ibid. 
29 Millward, James A. (2013). The Silk Road. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), p. 4 
30 Ibid, p. 5 
31 Ibid, p. 6 
32 Adshead, S. A. M. (1993). Central Asia in World History (Basingstoke: Macmillan), p. 32 
33 33 Clarke, Michael (2009). “The ‘centrality’ of Central Asia in the world history, 1700-2008”, in 
Mackerras, Colin & Clarke, Michael, Editors (2009). China, Xinjiang and Central Asia. History, 
transition and crossborder interaction into the 21st century (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 40 
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frontier for linguistic, cultural, religious, political and economic exchanges 34 . 
However China’s history with the Xinjiang region has been confrontational and 
resistant. Previously, Chinese dynasties only had political influence in Xinjiang, as 
well as a firmly established tributary relationship35. In the 18th century, during the 
Qing dynasty (1644 – 1911), China took direct control over the region in 1768 and 
called in Xinjiang, meaning ‘new frontier’36. However, the first inhabitants of 
Xinjiang were Turkic-speaking migrants from Mongolia, from whom the present 
Uyghurs claim descent37. The Turks originate in the same area as the Huns in 
Mongolia and migrated westwards as far as Europe38.  
 
The Uyghurs had a kingdom to the north of the Gobi desert, which was documented 
during the Tang dynasty39. However, since the Qing dynasty assumed direct Chinese 
control over the region, it has experienced continuous political and religious 
resistance. The neighbouring Khanate of Khokand (today parts of Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) had allied Islamic forces that declared a jihad 
on the Chinese administration and invaded in 1820 and 183040. Although these 
invasions were prevented, Chinese rule and sovereignty has continuously been 
questioned. There was a pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic revolution during the 1930s and 
in November 1933, the Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan was 
proclaimed41. Although this newly independent state only had four months of 
independence until it was conquered in February 1934 by Chinese forces, it was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Lattimore, Owen (1950). Pivot of Asia. Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company), p. 4 
35 Dillon, Michael (2004). Xinjiang–China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon), p. 17 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, p. 9 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, 18 
41 Ibid, p. 20 
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perceived as the direct descendant of the regime of Yakub Beg from 1867 to 1877 and 
this continuity is very important for Uyghur nationalists today42. Therefore it is clear 
that China has had a mixed history with Central Asia, since the various exchanges 
were positive and were promoted, yet the Chinese expansion westwards into Xinjiang 
has continuously been plagued with hostility and it is clear to see the national security 
importance of China’s westward regions. 
 
The importance and spread of Islam in Central Asia began in 7th century AD as the 
Arab universal caliphate conquered Persian territory in Central Asia43. However it 
was not able to conquer great parts of Central Asia because of resistance from the 
Tang Empire, and their Turk and Tibetan allies44. Although the Islamic territorial 
expansion was resisted, the religion of Islam permeated from group to group, people 
to people, until it managed to convert Tibetans, who were previously Buddhist, and 
Turks, who were previously Zoroastrians45. Particularly the Turks of Central Asia 
adopted Islam gradually after their ruler, the legendary Satuq Boghra Khan, was 
converted in 960 AD46. By the early 12th century Islam was the most influential 
religion in Central Asia47. Therefore the impact and dominance of Islam as a religion 
has been constant since its establishment in the region from the 7th to the 12th 
centuries. This has a big impact upon Central Asia today, since the radicalisation of 
Islam in the Middle East has had found its way into the region and could affect the 
stability.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Ibid, p. 21 
43 Millward, James A. (2013). The Silk Road. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), p. 32 
44 Adshead, S. A. M. (1993). Central Asia in World History (Basingstoke: Macmillan), p. 45 
45 Ibid. 
46 Dillon, Michael (2004). Xinjiang–China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon), p. 11 
47 Ibid. 
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Finally, great power rivalry has certainly been a feature of Central Asia over the past 
centuries. The geographer and academic, Sir Halford John Mackinder, labelled 
Central Asia as the ‘geographical pivot of history’48, because of all the conflicts 
between 5th to 15th centuries49. Mackinder describes Central Asia, not only as a pivot, 
but as a ‘living heart’50 or ‘heartland’51 of the globe. Geopolitically, Mackinder 
claimed that whoever controls the ‘heartland’, controls the world, because it is the 
geographical pivot between the continental and maritime powers52. His example is the 
great scourge that the Huns inflicted upon Europe53. He suggests that because of the 
raids that were conducted by the Huns from Central Asia, it directly or indirectly had 
an important effect upon modern European history54. It may not be surprising to 
witness other great powers enter into Central Asia to either deter China’s ambitions or 
at least balance against China’s dominance. Additionally, although scholars, such as 
Adshead, have indicated that Central Asia went from its ‘pivot’ and active phase into 
a passive phase55, the implication of China’s GWS would seemingly revive Central 
Asia’s passivity into activity. 
 
The ‘Great Game’ is another historical reference that could replicate itself in Central 
Asia. The ‘game’ refers to the conflicts of interests in Central Asia between the 
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Tsarist Russia and Great Britain and its empire56. The Anglo-Russian rivalry was 
indirect and based upon the perception that an expansive Russia in Central Asia 
would impede upon British interests and affect India’s security, its prized gem colony, 
during the 19th century57. The British belief was that Russia’s aggressive political and 
military advances in Central Asia against the khanates were aimed at laying the 
groundwork for a future invasion of India58. Therefore this perception played a role in 
the British foreign policy decision to invade Afghanistan in 183959, to create a buffer 
state. Thus, Central Asia and its political entities were thought to be pawns on a 
chessboard for Russia and Great Britain to manipulate one another with60. In 
contemporary Central Asia elements of great power rivalry can be seen between 
China, Russia and United States61. The section on great power rivalry will explore the 
dynamics and relationships between the great powers in Central Asia and whether 
they can seemingly pose a significant threat to China’s grand westward strategy. 
Conclusively the history of China-Central Asia relations, the silk road, Islam, and 
great power politics does certainly illustrate China’s rationale for pivoting east, but 
also it highlights the problems and threats that China will have to confront as it 
develops its grand westward strategy. 
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Great Power Relations and the Political Threats 
 
The ambitious SREB will inevitably draw Central Asia ever closer to the China orbit, 
which may create discomfort for regional and global leaders, namely Russia and the 
United States. This section is dissected into two major parts. The first part analyses 
the political threats from Russia, and the latter part illustrates potential risks posed by 
the United States. Each part consists of three components. The first part will evaluate 
each country’s capability to exert threats in Central Asia. The second component 
demonstrates each country’s incentive to execute that capability. Lastly, due to the 
dynamic and non-static nature of international events, a risk variable will be identified 
in order to accommodate potential alterations in countries’ incentives.  
 
POLITICAL THREATS – RUSSIA 
 
Capability    
The ability of Russia to exert influence in Central Asia is evident. The five countries, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were all former 
Soviet republics, gaining independence only after the Cold War. Consequently, 
Russia’s lingering presence in the region remains active, with Russia vigorously 
seeking political, economic and security cooperation with the countries through 
different organizations. This includes Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO).62 
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Though the five countries in the region are commonly perceived collectively, their 
affiliation with Russia must be analysed individually. If Russia is to threaten the 
implementation of SREB, it will achieve the most success by wielding its influence 
through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The two countries are socially and economically 
the weakest in Central Asia, and the most dependent on Russia. Tajikistan suffered a 
civil war in the 1990s, and Kyrgyzstan went through two revolutions in the last 
decade alone.63 The two cash-strapped countries rely on Russia for oil and gas 
imports. Kyrgyzstan for example, sold its state-run gas company to Russia’s Gazprom 
for the figurative price of $1 in exchange for a guaranteed supply of natural gas.64 
Likewise, landlocked Tajikistan receives its duty-free oil from Russia.65 Remittances 
are also another clear indicator of how large Russia’s economic role is in the two 
countries.  Money sent home from migrant labourers working in Russia comprised 
about 50% of Tajikistan’s GDP and 30% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP last year. 66 
Furthermore, Russia retains its military presence in the two countries. Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are home to the largest Russia military installations in the region, with 
increased numbers of air defence units at Kant airbase.67 Russia’s military and 
economic stronghold in the two countries greatly increases its influence and can upset 
China’s SREB initiative, if it desires to.  
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A potential specific scenario of how Russia may threaten SREB is by ordering 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan not to sign energy and trade treaties with China. 
Additionally, the construction of pipelines across the two countries would also be 
prohibited. Since the success of SREB requires the cooperation of all countries for 
continuity, such a threat is detrimental to the initiative. Russia could either do it by 
threatening the disruption of energy supply, or by rewarding the two countries with 
economic subsidiaries.  
 
Compare to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it is less probable for Russia to pressure 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Economically, Russia’s monopoly over 
gas deals and its grip on pipelines have ceased due to China’s economic advancement. 
The resource-rich countries have successfully diversified their gas delivery routes 
away from Russia towards the Chinese market.68 Politically, the annexation of Crimea 
by Russia has prompted concerns amongst Central Asian countries, in view of 
Russia’s encroachments on its former Soviet republics. The leading critic between the 
three is Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov has expressed anxiety 
about Russia’s military presence in neighbouring states. 69  While Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan abstained from voting for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 
Uzbek leader voiced its discontent about Russia at the fourth summit of the 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).70 
Consequently, it is more feasible for Russia to impact negatively on China’s SREB 
through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan than the other three countries.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Incentive  
It is established that Russia has the capability to wield substantial threats to SREB 
through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This capability would be irrelevant, however, if 
Russia has no incentive to obstruct China’s SREB. It is believed that Russia will be 
cooperative with China’s SREB initiative, and will not seek to exploit the opportunity 
to disrupt it. Its support of SREB is due to several push and pull factors.  
 
The push factor is Russia’s isolation from the international community by the West. 
Russia’s decision to annex Crimea provoked international outcry. Specific measures 
are implemented to condemn the perceived aggression. This includes Russia being 
expelled from the G8 group, EU downgrading its relationship with Russia, and 
various economic sanctions led by the United States.71 The criticism also prompted 
Russian delegates to suspend their participation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, and postpone Russia’s accession process to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 72  This push factor sidelined 
Russia, and forced a readjustment of its foreign policies away from the West, and 
closer to its uncritical eastern counterparts.  
 
Being pushed away by the international community does not guarantee a closer 
relationship between China and Russia. The pull factor is what encouraged Russia to 
strengthen its ties with China, thus Russia is an equal stakeholder for the success of 
SREB. The pull factor here is the similarities of their domestic political structure. 
Scholar John Ruggie was the first to recognize how “domestic political forces !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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determine patterns of international cooperation.”73 A constructivist by heart, Ruggie 
specified that strong ties would exist between states that have similar norms of 
sociality, such as what he termed ‘state-society relationship’.74 These nations will find 
it easier to instigate trust and a sense of understanding.  
 
China and Russia’s domestic political structures are similar. Both nations are 
authoritarian in nature, with strong and charismatic leaders. Chinese president Xi 
Jingping’s Communist Party has monopolistic position. Meanwhile, Russia’s ruling 
political party ‘United Russia’, directed by Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s close ally, 
enjoys a quasi-monopoly, winning majority in all consecutive elections since its 
creation in 2001.75 Other than similarity in its political structure, both countries have 
an interventionist ‘state-society relationship’, characterized by powerful 
bureaucracies, prevalence of state-owned companies and widespread corruption.76 
Furthermore, both countries approve of each other’s hard-line approach towards 
dissidents and separatists, and share their contempt for human rights. Their similar 
social norms creates an understanding of each other’s mentality and behaviour. Both 
of them are perceived as “outliers” of the current international norm, which triumphs 
liberalism. Consequently, the two countries share parallel sentiments towards their 
western counterparts. Their domestic politics and norms transcend to influence their 
foreign policies of each other. The theory serves to explain Russia’s incline to 
cooperate with, rather than to jeopardize, the China-initiated SREB. 
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Another pull factor that encourages Russia’s cooperation in SREB is the potential 
economic benefits offered. Recent drop of oil price has upset Russian economy 
immensely. Russia risks of losing 2 billion USD in revenue for every one dollar drop 
in oil price. It is predicted by the World Bank that without a recovery of oil price, 
Russia’s economy would shrink by at least 0.7% in 2015.77 Looking forward at the 
economic projection, it seems that China’s SREB could alleviate and improve 
Russia’s troubled economy. According to Vasiliy Kashin, a senior researcher at 
Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, SREB can assist Russia to 
“reduce its reliance on European markets” and cope with the “current economic drag 
amid Western sanctions”. 78  The initiative would bring investment into the 
infrastructure connecting Russia with Asia, and allows for the export expansion of 
Russian non-energy commodities. The economic diversification includes grain, 
metals and chemical products.79 Similar opinion was raised by Petr Mozias from the 
National Research University's High School of Economics, who suggests Russia to 
“take the opportunity”, and “attract Chinese investments in infrastructure, energy and 
manufacturing, as well as coordinate economic projects in the Central Asia.”80 
 
The pull and push factors seek to explain why Russia is currently engaging actively 
with China’s SREB, rather than competing against it. Currently, Putin has given Xi 
the green light to proceed SREB in Central Asia, after Xi agree to include Trans-
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Siberian and Baikal–Amur Mainline in the scheme. 81  Alexander Gabuev from 
European Council on Foreign Relations also said that Moscow is “ready to accept 
Beijing’s new role as a major economic power in Central Asia”.82 Russia now hopes 
to maintain its role in Central Asia as the region’s security provider through CIS, and 
its mutual defence alliance, CSTO, instead of its biggest economic trading partner, 
which China will assume.83 As a result, the capability of Russia to threaten SREB is 
possible and strategically relevant. Nonetheless, the motivational likelihood of Russia 
executing its capability is slim, due to the several pull and push factors identified 
above.  
 
Risk Variable  
Decision-making in the international community, however, is subject to constant 
change. Currently, Russia values China’s cooperation and is willing to compromise its 
regional power status in Central Asia. A risk variable is Russia may re-evaluate its 
foreign policy strategy, and prefer its leadership role and dominance over the 
economic benefit of SREB and strategic partnership with China. Already, the two 
countries have significant influence over the region and it could be exploited for 
rivalry rather than cooperation. 
 
The most prominent example of China and Russia wrestling for regional influence is 
Kazakhstan, which is on the border of both countries. It is the biggest country in 
Central Asia, and will be an integral part of the SREB project. Historically, Russia has 
always been a strong partner of Kazakhstan in the economic, military and space !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sector.84 One high profile defence deal that demonstrates their strategic relations is 
Russia’s supply of “five S-300PS surface-to-air missile systems to Kazakhstan on a 
grant basis,”85 China, on the other hand, has attempted to strengthen its tie with 
Kazakhstan by giving out substantial loans. Currently, Astana owes Beijing 15.8 
billion dollars, which is almost four times the amount it owes to Moscow.86 China 
also seek to increase its soft power by opening up four Confucius institutes in the city 
of Almaty, Astana, Aktobe and Karaganda. To promote cultural exchange, it also 
offers places at Chinese universities to more than 10,000 Kazakhstani students.87” 
Both countries are strengthening their relationship with Kazakhstan through different 
means, seeking compete for influence of the country.  
 
Though Russia may be wary of any “prospective increase in Chinese influence in 
former Soviet states”88, the current policies implemented suggests a tendency of 
Russian policy makers to prioritize cooperation over competition- a trend that is likely 
to endure in the future. This inclination to cooperate is observed in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO contains Russia and China, the other four 
members are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as other 
neighbouring countries. In the past, Russia has been reluctant to relinquish its 
leadership position. Recently however, the SCO decided to admit India and Pakistan 
as full members, signifying a potential dilution of Russian influence, and a shared 
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leadership and balance of power in the organization. 89  As a result, current 
developments project a more cooperative Russia. Whether or not Russia will divert 
from its existing strategy requires the unfolding of future events. Currently, however, 
any substantial political threat posed by Russia to China’s SREB initiative remains 
retrained, despite Russia’s capability to perform the threats.  
 
 
POLITICAL THREATS – THE UNITED STATES 
 
Capability   
The capability of the United States to exert power in Central Asia is less than Russia. 
As professor Wang Jisi noted: “Unlike East Asia where five of the U.S. allies are 
located, the U.S. diplomatic and strategic relationship with Central Asia countries 
remains limited.”90 Up until recently, the United States have perceived the region 
largely through the lens of the War on Terror. During the U.S. war in Afghanistan, 
Central Asian countries hosted U.S. military bases and participated in logistical 
efforts through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). 91  U.S. forces were 
stationed in Kyrgyzstan (Manas base) and Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad base). 
Operated by the US Air Force, Manas served as a primary transit facility for 
transferring equipment and personnel into and out of Afghanistan 92 . In 2014, 
following the announcement to reduce troop levels in Afghanistan to 9800 soldiers, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the United States quietly, but significantly, closed its Manas base, the last U.S. 
military base in Central Asia93.  
 
The closure of Manas signalled America’s “end of an era in Central Asia”.94 It 
indicates a waning of American military influence in the region. More importantly, it 
demonstrated to Central Asian countries that the United States’ lack of commitment 
in the region in post- war era. This prompts them to believe that the United States do 
not have a “clear, long-term plan to engage with the region, which ranks low on its 
list of geopolitical priorities.”95 This perception significantly diminishes the U.S. 
influence in the region, as countries prefer to view Russia and China as the main 
pillars of regional security, given their consistent interest in the region. 
 
The U.S. ability to wield diplomatic power in Central Asia is also fairly inadequate. 
As illustrated in the Russian analysis, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan remain explicitly 
pro-Russia. Kazakhstan, the most developed country in Central Asia, maintains a 
neutral stance between the Russia and the United States. The country that is most 
resistant to Russian influence and most open to U.S. cooperation is Uzbekistan. U.S. 
officials have made frequent trips to Uzbekistan, and the United States have recently 
stepped up its security assistance.96 One great incentive for Uzbekistan’s closer ties 
with the United States is its suspicion of Russian interference in Central Asia. Also, 
Uzbekistan has its own ambition for regional leadership, and thus refuses to support 
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the creation of the CSTO Collective Rapid Deployment Force.97 The decision was 
made, as it fears that the Force would strengthen Moscow’s military presence in 
Central Asia, and gives Moscow a tool for military intervention.  
 
Though Uzbekistan is the most pro-U.S. amongst its neighbours, the relationship it 
has with the United States is far from seamless. The fragmented friendship cannot 
serve as a substantial leverage to jeopardize China’s SREB. A big breakdown 
between the two countries, which resulted in the shutdown of U.S. military base in 
Uzbekistan, occurred in 2005.98 The United States criticized Uzbek government’s 
forceful handling of the uprising in Andijon, whereby it fired into a crowd of 
protestors, causing significant numbers of casualties.99 As illustrated in the Russian 
analysis, domestic politics can affect foreign policies, as proposed by John Ruggie. 
Whereby Russia and China’s similar domestic political structure impacts their foreign 
policies positively, the stark difference between Uzbekistan and the U.S. norms, 
values and governance, will always be a sticking point in their relationship. As long 
as the United States continues to be a strong advocate for human rights, its diplomatic 
relationship with Uzbekistan will maintain fragile. Thus, its capability to exert 
influence in Uzbekistan, for the purpose of threatening the SREB, will remain 
constrained. The United States, instead of being a genuine partner, will continuously 
be a country that Uzbekistan expediently utilizes to counterbalance Russian influence. 
 
The United States is aware of its declining influence in Central Asia after 
withdrawing from Afghanistan, and is seeking to use economic leverage to continue !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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its involvement in the region. The New Silk Road initiative, first unveiled by then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011, was designed to turn post-war Afghanistan 
into a hub of commerce between Central and South Asia.100 Nonetheless, the initiative 
was light on specifics, and has had little political and financial support from both 
Afghanistan and countries in Central and South Asia.101  This is a competitive 
initiative, but is in direct contrast with the SREB initiative, because China’s initiative 
has already made progress with the establishment of the AIIB and Xi’s effort to 
conduct regular visits to Central Asia. To many observers, the New Silk Road has 
become little more than “a slogan designed to show the Central Asians and Afghans 
that the U.S. has a plan for the region after the withdrawal of its combat forces.”102 
Consequently, the U.S. ability to curtail the success of SREB through economic 
power in Central Asia also remains inadequate. An analysis of the U.S. current 
economic, military and diplomatic commitment in Central Asia reveals a disengaged 
U.S. in the post-war era. 
 
Incentive  
The U.S. incentive to sabotage the SREB initiative would be its fear of an 
increasingly powerful China. If the United States believes its national security has 
been compromised, due to China’s growing influence in the international community, 
it may strategically decide to renew its interest in Central Asia. This will result in a 
stronger U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic presence.  
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The U.S. incentive to contain China is best illustrated by power transition theory. The 
theory, as advocated by Abramo Organski in 1958, assumes that the international 
system is hierarchical, with a dominant nation possessing the largest portion of power 
resources.103 The dominant nation is a ‘status quo’ power, as it desires to maintain the 
international order it establishes. Beneath the ‘dominant nation’ lie several other 
‘great powers’ that have the ability to exert power “beyond its geographic region”.104 
A great power nation can be classified as revisionist if it has the incentive to disrupt 
the status quo. A dominant nation would attempt to control and diminish a revisionist 
great power that is dissatisfied with the current international norms.105 To put in 
context, the United States is still the dominant nation, which leads a democratic model 
as the global order. China, being a great power, adopts an authoritarian and state-
centric model. This makes China a potential revisionist and dissatisfied power that 
wishes to change the status quo. Given the circumstances described, the United States 
would inevitably seek to contain China’s increased influence in the international 
community. Thus, its decision to re-enter Central Asia and disrupt China’s SREB is 
probable.  
 
The theory alludes to the need for a containment of China from the United States. 
Nevertheless, the likelihood of the United States resuming its appearance in Central 
Asia is slim. This is because the United States has already adopted another strategy to 
effectively contain China, and may not perceive its presence in Central Asia as the 
most efficient strategy. The current strategy implemented by the Obama 
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Administration is termed as ‘Pivot to Asia’. 106 Launched in 2011, the Pivot to Asia 
permitted the United States to strengthen U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, and 
Thailand; expanded cooperation with Australia and India; developed programs to 
increase people-to-people ties with the Philippines; and tightened its partnership with 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore.107 Economically, the Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) free trade agreement is also a major feature in U.S. strategy. Given that five of 
its seven mutual defence alliances are in South and East Asia, and the complexity of 
the current policy, it will be more effective for the United States to continue its 
strategy, than to redirect resources to Central Asia.  
 
Moreover, Central Asia is a region that could serve as a cooperative region among the 
great powers instead of rivalry. As Professor Wang Jisi mentioned, the United States, 
China and Russia share common interests in the region, whereby all of them wish the 
region to be stable, and free of extremists’ ideologies.108 Thus, the three countries 
have the potential to cooperate in fighting against the growth of radicalism and the 
drug trade. 
 
Risk Variable 
The risk variable identified here is the possibility of the United States to intensify its 
containment strategy. This may occur if the successful execution of SREB is able to 
grant China growing influence. Thus, the United States may deem its strategy of Pivot 
to Asia insufficient to contain China and include Central Asia within its strategy. The 
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examination is supported by the power transition theory. It states that the danger of 
war is most imminent if the revisionist great power (China) reaches a certain level of 
power parity with the dominant power (the US).109 According to Organski and 
Kugler, when a rising power reached 80% of the capability of the dominant nation, 
the situation would instigate a sense of insecurity for the dominant nation.110 The 
dominant power will, in return, implement different measures in order to lower the 
percentage.111 
 
It is understood that the current capability of China to challenge the United States is 
much less than 80%. Nonetheless, if the evolution of SREB is successful, it will 
increase China’s hard and soft powers in Central Asia. This then gives the ‘China 
model’ valuable support, and it can export it to the countries around the ‘Belt’ and 
beyond. The potential of the SREB to assist China in reaching power parity with the 
United States may encourage it to disrupt, or even sabotage the initiative. 
Consequently, the theory indicates a direr assessment of the U.S. perception on SREB. 
For now at least, the political threat to China’s SREB, whereby the United State 
renew its interest and presence in Central Asia, is not prominent.  
 
Conclusion 
Russia has the substantial capability to exert political influences against China’s GWS 
in Central Asia, although it has little incentive to execute that capability. It is 
predicted that Russia will continue its strategy to prioritize cooperation over 
competition. The United States, on the contrary, has limited influence in Central Asia, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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given its diminished military, economic and diplomatic presence in the region. 
Currently, the United States does not have a huge incentive to increase its influence in 
Central Asia and disrupt China’s SREB initiative, given that its appearance in South 
and East Asia around China’s periphery requires complex management and is 
perceived sufficient to contain China. Nonetheless, this assessment, and the U.S. 
containment strategy are subject to change if SREB grants China immense power that 
significantly lowers its sense of security. 
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Regional Political Risks 
 
The main purpose of this section is to look at the dangers the SREB initiative may 
encounter in Central Asia, and assess them to understand the probability and potential 
damage. First, it is necessary to draw a line between the terms ‘threat’ and ‘risk’. The 
classic definitions state “risk is commonly defined as a composite measure of the 
probability and negative consequences of a given phenomenon, whereas a threat is 
linked to the intensions and capabilities of a particular source to inflict harm”112. This 
section of the research is going to focus on political risks on the regional level and 
measure the danger they may pose to the Chinese SREB initiative. 
 
To assess such a risk, first it is necessary to determine what are the main components 
of the risk and how it relates to political processes, in contrast to a more traditional 
understanding of risk in economics and finance. According to the head of a leading 
political risk consultancy company – the Eurasia Group, Ian Bremmer “risk is the 
probability that any event will turn into a measurable loss. It is composed of two 
factors, probability and impact”113. In classic finance risk management, experts use 
sophisticated mathematical models to quantify both of these factors114. These models 
require a lot of specific quantitative data, carefully gathered by different economic 
and financial institutions115. However the nature of political risk makes it much harder 
to employ quantitative methods. Bremmer adds further “political risk is the 
probability that a particular political action will produce changes in economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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outcomes. Most political risks are […] very hard to quantify”116. As The Economist’s 
‘Guide to Country Risk’ notes “political risk in now a more complex, 
multidimensional phenomenon, which requires broader analysis of the policy and 
institutional risks”117. In Central Asia political risks are derived from a wide number 
of regional actors, including actions of governments, politicians, interest groups, and 
local communities. 
 
In terms of methodology this section will employ a qualitative approach, which 
allows producing assessments, based on expert opinions and research118. For this 
purpose a simple Risk Assessment Grading Model will be employed, where the value 
of each variable can be expressed by three grades (low, medium and high). An 
additional tool, which is going to be used for the risk assessment is offered by Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in their book119 “Why Nations Fail”120. Their 
theory is built on looking at political and economic institutions, which can be 
inclusive and exclusive in nature121, are functioning in a given state and able to 
influence its ability to withstand shocks and risks122. To evaluate the quality of 
political and economic institution in Central Asian states a number of composite 
indexes produced by Transparency International, World Bank123, and other renowned 
organizations will be employed. According to Mina Toksöz, a specialist in country 
risk “Institutional strength is a crucial element of political and economic stability”124. 
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This section of the paper is going to assess four different types of political risk, which 
have low-to-high impacts and medium-to-high probabilities. For each type of risk a 
number of case studies will be presented to illustrate the assessment process and 
provide the underlying reasons. To assess the two main factors – probability and 
impact, a simple 3-stage grading scale will be employed, ranging from low to high 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Political risk grading scale. 
Grade Risk Probability Risk Impact 
Low 
This risk is not likely to 
happen in the near future, 
and should be allocated 
lower position in the risk 
mitigation priorities 
This risk does not pose a 
serious thereat to the 
Chinese SREB initiative 
and can be given a low 
priority  
Medium 
This risk is likely outcome 
of the current situation and 
should receive special 
attention within the risk 
mitigation process 
This risk present a 
considerable threat to the 
SREB initiative and may 
serve as a serious setback 
High 
This risk is almost bound to 
happen, and its mitigation 
should be considered as a 
very high priority 
This risk poses an inherent 
danger to the SREB 
initiative and may 
negatively affect the whole 
initiative 
 
To classify political risks at the country level Ian Bremmer and Preston Keat offer 
simple framework. Political risks can either be ‘internal’ or ‘external’, meaning that 
the main causes of potential disturbance may lie within the borders of a given state or 
come from the outside125. From another perspective, political risks can be ‘societal’, 
meaning that the roots of a disturbance originate within the country’s broader society, 
or governmental, meaning that they are a direct result of governments actions126. The 
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following table will present the risks assessed in the section, assessments and the case 
studies (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Political risks assessed, findings, case studies. 
Risk Risk Type Risk Probability Risk Impact Case Studies 
Civic Unrest 
& Regime 
Collapse 
Internal 
societal/Internal 
governmental 
  
Low/ 
Medium 
 
Medium/ 
High 
 
Kazakhstan 
Anti-Chinese 
Backlash 
External societal 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Armed 
Conflict 
External 
governmental 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Uzbekistan 
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyzstan !
 
Internal societal and governmental risks. Civil unrest and regime collapse 
Due to the autocratic nature of Central Asian states, a potential instability caused by 
internal factors, both societal and governmental remain a serious concern. In a state 
with political institutions, both types of risks are closely related, since every aspect of 
society’s life is determined by the actions of the political elite or the autocratic leader. 
Each type of risk can potentially lead to another one, thus creating a vicious cycle of 
instability. For China’s SREB initiative, political stability in Central Asian states is of 
utmost importance, since the repercussions of the internal risks may dramatically 
change political landscape in the country and the region as a whole. For these types of 
risks Kazakhstan will be used as a case study. 
 
The successful implementation of the SREB initiative in Central Asia relies heavily 
on Kazakhstan, one of the most important states for China’s GWS and the biggest and 
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most economically developed country in the region127. Since the collapse of the 
USSR, almost quarter century ago Kazakhstan has remained the most stable country 
in the region, under the leadership of the first president of Kazakhstan Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, who recently has won yet another elections, solidifying his position as a 
national leader with 97 percent of the vote. 128 
 
For China, Kazakhstan plays a very important role. First of all, since the end of 1990s, 
it has been attracting a lot of Chinese investment, due to its stability and Nazarbayev’s 
favourable attitude towards China129. Since then Chinese companies have acquired 
shares in many local enterprises, mainly in oil and gas industry and different 
infrastructure projects130. Moreover, Kazakhstan geographical location makes it a 
crucial link for the SREB initiative in Central Asia. The shared Sino-Kazakh border 
has enormous security implications for China, especially since Kazakhstan has a 
substantial Uyghur minority, which is believed to be tightly connected to their fellow 
men living in China131. In the past, Uyghur extremists in China were able to flee 
beyond the Chinese borders and fins shelter in Kazakhstan 132 . Therefore, to 
effectively control Xinjiang, Beijing had to cooperate with Astana. According to the 
analysts “China hopes that the SREB will boost Xinjiang’s economic fortunes, and 
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that this growth will help quell ethnic tensions in the Uyghur Autonomous Region”133. 
Thus, “Kazakhstan, which shares a lengthy border with Xinjiang, is seen as a first step 
on Silk Road that will make economic development possible”134. The geographical 
location and extensive territory also mean that Kazakhstan is very important for the 
SREB, as the main part of the landmass connecting China with the West. 
 
The importance of Kazakhstan has been emphasized by numerous visits on the 
highest level. Both President Xi Jinping135 and Premier Li Keqiang136 have visited 
Astana, promoting China’s vision of the New Silk Road. In turn, President 
Nazarbayev seems to have a positive attitude towards the new initiative and economic 
integration in the region in general. He ahs been promoting ideas for Eurasian 
integration since 1994137 and under his leadership Kazakhstan became a member of 
the EAEU138. Early this year, Kazakhstan promised to invest $20 billion in the SREB 
initiative before 2020139. 
 
The relative internal stability and Nazarbayev’s leadership position seem to very 
solid. Nazarbayev, who has been president since 1991, has created a rigid political 
system where he is balancing against powerful local clans, not giving any of them to 
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gather enough power to challenge him140. During his 25-year presidency Nazarbayev 
has managed to solidify his position and create a stable state with gradually improving 
economic conditions and living standards. He also has been avoiding many dividing 
issues in his foreign policy, thus trying to preserve internal unity. The several cases of 
civil unrest, as in 1999-2000 by pro-Russian militants141 and in 2011 by dissatisfied 
local people in Zhanaozen142 were swiftly trampled with the use of force and didn’t 
result in any serious political repercussions for the regime. This means that in terms of 
probability, this risk currently may be deemed as low. In terms of impact, civil 
instability may result in an attempt to change the government, with unpredictable 
results. However Chinese interests are well protected by the current government, so as 
long as it stays in power the impact may be deemed as medium. 
 
However, the more serious risk to the SREB initiative lies in the same political 
system, which provides stability in Kazakhstan. While Nazarbaev has eased his grip 
on the economic institutions, providing basis for a more efficient redistribution of 
wealth, the political institutions in Kazakhstan remain underdeveloped and tightly 
controlled. The main concern among local elites and foreign investors and experts is 
the president’s old age and a lack of clarity about the power transition mechanisms143. 
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The constitution allows Nazarbayev to be elected as president an infinite number144 of 
times and this year he has turned 74 years old145. The official life expectancy for men 
in Kazakhstan is 65 years146, which means that there is a possibility of president dying 
in office. The local media has been portraying Nazarbayev as the ‘Leader of the 
Nation’147 and according to the analysts “the 74-year-old Kazakh president, the 
second longest-serving leader of any former Soviet republic, has shown no sign of 
surrendering power anytime soon”148. 
 
So far the president has failed to provide his thoughts on any kind of political 
succession149. The long presidency of Nazarbayev means that there hasn’t been a 
single power transition in the nations 25-years history. The mechanisms, which are 
supposed to guide such a transition, have failed to develop. As a result the death of 
the president may lead to an unexpected change of political landscape or even throw 
the country into a political vacuum, where powerful clans, free from Nazarbayev’s 
watchful eye would start fighting for power. Such an outcome would have 
catastrophic results for the country, exacerbating the existing conflicts and inflaming 
new ones. The lack of legitimate authority may provoke a sharp change in the 
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country’s development, leading to increasing political unrest, ethnic fragmentation 
and even a civil war150. 
 
Such outcomes may present a severe threat to China’s investment in the country and 
the infrastructure projects for the SREB initiative. An outbreak of political instability 
and armed clashes between different factions may pose serious threat to China’s 
investment and personnel. Even if the country manage to avoid civil war, a sudden 
change of regime may lead to a change of foreign policy, which could become more 
hostile towards China151. This means that Beijing will have to seek contact with the 
members of the elite of the opposition who might be considered a potential successor 
to Nazarbayev. However, since there is still no indication from current president, 
China would have to bet on one faction or another. And if Beijing’s bet would prove 
wrong, the consequences may prove dire. 
 
Overall, Kazakhstan scores in different indexes assessing the level of institutions’ 
development remain low, which means that in the absence of a strong autocratic 
power the country can easily plunge into chaos, though it is necessary to mention that 
the region has witnessed a similar case in Turkmenistan, where despite the low 
quality of institutions, the power transition went smoothly and the country avoided 
any serious instability152. As a result, the probability of this risk can be stated as 
medium, while the impact is high. 
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External societal risk. Anti-Chinese backlash. 
China’s rapid expansion in the neighbouring countries brought new investment and 
economic opportunities, but at the same time has created tension among the local 
communities. While Central Asian leaders are welcoming new sources of wealth in 
the form of Chinese investment, the general public is much more cautious. For the 
local leader, investments from China offer rich and immediate economic benefits 
without any criticism, as in the case of the West or demands for political loyalty as in 
the case of Russia. For this type of risk, two case studies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
will be presented. Both countries have a shared border with China and thus are more 
open to its influence, than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  
 
The anti-Chinese sentiment in the local communities creates a risk of a potential 
violent backlash against Chinese nationals, working in the region, Chinese companies 
and their properties. According to a former member of Kyrgyzstan’s parliament 
“Local media, opposition groups and popular opinion are often sceptical of China’s 
rising presence in Central Asia. While there is a variation among the region’s post-
Soviet republics, certain themes reappear – concern about the inflow of Chinese 
labour, disputes about land and territory and scepticism about the management of 
commercial deals”153. In a number of cases, as in 2011 in Kyrgyzstan154 and 2012 in 
Tajikistan155, Chinese workers were violently attacked by a group of local people.  
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There are numerous causes for the anti-Chinese sentiment in Central Asian countries. 
First, there is a question of land and official borders. In 2002, after a series of 
negotiations both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan singed treaties with China, in accordance 
to which they ceded disputed lands at their respective borders156. Tajikistan did the 
same thing again in 2011157. These actions caused a high level of dissatisfaction 
among the general population158 and were used by opposition leaders as a proof that 
national leaders were bribed by Beijing to accept the treaty. Moreover, most of 
Chinese investments in these countries were aimed at acquiring access to natural 
resources. Leaders of the local opposition have been blaming the central governments 
for ‘selling country’s national treasures’ to China159. 
 
The problem with lack of mutual trust is exacerbated by the way Chinese companies 
conduct business in Central Asia. New infrastructure projects demand extensive and 
skilled workforce. According to Chinese companies, local labour market can’t supply 
workers with the necessary level of qualification160. Chinese companies mostly refuse 
to hire local people for any skilled jobs, instead preferring to bring workers from 
China161. Even those local people, who were hired by Chinese companies, have been 
complaining that their Chinese colleagues receive much higher compensations162. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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These claims have created a level of strain between local and Chinese workers. To 
alleviate the tension and avoid clashes with local populations, Chinese companies 
have been creating special camps, outside of local communities, where Chinese 
workers can live163. Keeping these camps functional requires hiring additional 
personnel, such as Chinese cooks, doctors and security guards, in effect creating 
autonomous settlements within the borders of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan164. These 
settlements have aroused a lot of suspicion from the members of the local 
communities. According to a local expert “There is a widespread perception in 
Central Asia that China encourages migration in order to reduce the pressure of 
overpopulation, and to settle groups of Chinese nationals who can influence the 
politics of Central Asian countries”165. This perceived colonization has led to an 
outbreak of violent clashes in Tajikistan during the last five years166. 
 
This wave of suspicions and misunderstanding is partly to blame on Chinese 
companies’ PR policies. Instead of trying to engage local communities in a productive 
dialogue, they prefer to look for support from high-ranking officials at the national 
and regional levels167. A high level of corruption means that there is a serious mistrust 
between local communities and government officials, who they believe are being 
bribed by the representatives of Chinese companies168. In Kyrgyzstan, during the 
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corruption and conspiracy with Chinese business169. “In Kyrgyzstan, nationalist 
factions, youth organizations and opposition groups claim that the Chinese foothold in 
the country is an imminent threat to national interests. A series of high-publicized 
scandals implicating Chinese businessmen in bribery and corruption have fed public 
sensitivity over business dealings with China”170. 
 
Another serious issue, connected with corruption is environmental policies. Chinese 
companies are infamous for their poor ecological standards, the fact that makes local 
populations highly concern over potential infrastructure or mining projects close to 
local communities171. On many occasions, representatives of local communities 
claimed that ecological compensations, provided by Chinese companies were 
substantially smaller than the damage to the environment produced by these 
companies172. The fears of widespread corruption among local officials led to 
speculations that the officials in charge of the local environment protection had been 
bribed by Chinese businessmen to neglect the damage to the environment173. 
 
Anti-Chinese sentiments are actively used by political rivals of the national leaders, 
including “Free People” movement in Kyrgyzstan and “Homeland” movement in 
Tajikistan174. They point out the increasing number of Chinese nationals in the 
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country, which includes not only hired workers, but also Chinese traders who create 
severe competition for the local small and medium-size businesses175. Another image, 
used by nationalists is Beijing’s policy in the neighbouring province of Xinjiang, 
where the government has been consistently pursuing a policy of relocation Han 
Chinese into the province, thus transforming local Uyghur people into an ethnical 
minority176. 
 
All the causes, mentioned above create a highly explosive situation, where even a 
minor incident can lead to serious consequences and the outbreak of violence. The 
combination of mutual distrust, corruption and poor communication may result into a 
risk for the SREB initiative in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Overall it is possible to 
notice the trend, which demonstrates a connection between the increasing Chinese 
involvement in the region and the rising level of distrust among the local populations. 
While the local leaders and high-ranking officials remain positively disposed towards 
China’s initiative, at least while they are benefiting from it, general public feels 
frustrated about these issued involving Chinese companies. With the application of 
the institutional framework it is clear that political and economic institutions in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries largely remain exclusive. 
The composite indexes show that in terms of Rule of Law177 and Control of 
Corruption178 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan score relatively low. Thus the possibility of 
conflict resolution through normal political process is reduced to a minimum. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As a result, the probability of the external societal risk can be stated as high. An 
outbreak of violence may threaten Chinese nationals in Central Asia, companies and 
their properties. The impact of such an outbreak in comparison with the whole size of 
the SREB initiative can be deemed low. However, the loss of property and lives 
would result in serious reputational costs and the necessity to retaliate through 
different means available. A harsh response will damage China’s image in the region 
even more, while a mild one may be interpreted as Beijing’s inability to protect its 
own investments. 
 
 
External governmental risk. Armed conflict 
At first glance any possibility of an armed conflict between Central Asian states 
seems rather low. Four out of five countries in the region (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), an organization, which has a common security agenda for the member-
states179. Moreover, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also members of the 
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes an 
official military alliance180. 
 
However, some experts have been predicting an armed conflict in the region for the 
last 15 years181. The reasons for a potential conflict lie in the geographic and climatic 
conditions in the region and it historical heritage. The first point of conflict derives !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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from the fact that “border delineation is not wholly complete, and border management 
remains a problem”182. This situation has lead to a number of disputes between the 
different states. In the case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, almost 20% of the border 
zone remains unchartered, with territories claimed by both countries183. 
 
The second serious issue is the competition over the limited water resources184. 
According to statistics, the level of per capita water use in Uzbekistan is among the 
highest in the world185, with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan following closely by186. The 
drought-afflicted climate requires substantial water resources to support the 
agricultural production in the region. In Uzbekistan only 9% of the water used is spent 
on population’s needs, while 91% is spent on agriculture187. With such a high level of 
consumption and the relatively scares water resources, the access to them becomes 
one of the crucial necessity for Central Asian states.  
 
 
To access the risk of a possible armed conflict in the region, the cases of Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are going to be studied. All the three states are involved 
into a dispute over water resources and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan share a border, 
which remains mined188. Due to the geographical conditions, major rivers in the 
region flow through the territory of several states, so the management of water !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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resource becomes a serious issue in countries’ bilateral relations. This problem 
became more serious during Soviet industrialization, when the construction of 
hydroelectric power stations had begun189. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant 
that many projects were left unfinished. Yet, after the turbulent 1990s were over, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan returned to these projects, trying to acquire a 
source of inexpensive power190. The construction of a hydroelectric power plant 
involves the erection of dams that manage the water flow. These dams in any given 
country may create a serious disruption of water flows in the other countries in the 
region. Uzbekistan is considered to be most heavily affected state, with its high level 
of water consumption. 
 
When both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan became involved into rebuilding their 
hydroelectric capabilities, Uzbekistan faced a potentially tremendous damage to its 
agriculture due to water shortages, inflicted by the dams in the other two countries191. 
President Karimov’s warnings were ignored and in 2012 he threatened that if no 
cooperative mechanisms for the management of water resource could be created, the 
only other possible solution would be war192. Some experts believe that potential 
damage to regional agriculture would be so great, that it would outweigh potential 
losses of going to war193.  
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Assessing the possibility of the war, the case can be maid, that not a single state in 
Central Asia is a proper democracy. According to the theory of ‘democratic peace’ 
democracies don’t fight each other194. If the reverse is true, meaning that autocratic 
states, that lack developed political and economic institutions are bound to clash at 
some point, the probability of the armed conflict can be considered continuously high. 
However, during the 1990s, when the United States was only starting to explore the 
possibilities of cooperating with Central Asia, Russia was recovering from the ‘shock 
therapy’ and China was concentrated on its economic development, Central Asia was 
more or less left to itself. And even though this turbulent decade saw a civil war in 
Tajikistan and minor ethnic conflicts in some other countries, there has been no major 
war in the region. Today, when Russia and China are actively involved in Central 
Asia, with the existence of the SCO and CSTO there is much more room for dialogue 
and cooperation. 
 
Thus the possibility of an open armed conflict between the Central Asian states may 
be deemed as low. Though there are some serious conflicts, which involve the 
respective national interest of each state, the opportunities for conflict resolution and 
dialogue are much more numerous that 20 years ago. In terms of impact, an armed 
conflict in the region would be a devastating blow for the Chinese GWS and the 
implementation process of the SREB initiative. An outbreak of military activities in 
the region will scare off the investors, may damage or destroy existing infrastructure 
and severely limit the option available for new projects. An armed conflict between 
Central Asian states will lead to increased instability will require evacuation of 
Chinese nationals from the region and lead to displacement of tens of thousand of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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people. Therefore while the possibility of an armed conflict in the region is low, the 
potential impact is high. 
 
Conclusion 
This section of the research has identified four risks that China will face, 
implementing its SREB initiative in Central Asia. These risks have different 
possibilities and different impacts. Some of them may create a severe setback for 
China’s policies in the region, while others may challenge the basic principles of 
Beijing’s foreign policy. Assessment of the risk is a first step on the way to its 
mitigation. Each of these risks can and should be anticipated and mitigated with the 
use of different techniques. Modern political risk mitigation techniques include 
engagement with local governments, creation of joint ventures, engagement with local 
communities, scenario planning, hiring professional consultants, engagement with 
NGOs and many others195. 
 
By applying these techniques Chinese decision makers can influence both the 
probability and the impact of the political risk in questions. Even simple anticipation 
and preparation of crisis management solutions may seriously improve the positions 
of the SREB initiative in the region. The difficulty of this approach is that most of 
political risks do not exist in a pure vacuum, but instead interact with each other in a 
great number of ways and any of the four risks assessed in this section can lead to a 
cascade of other risks. In is important to establish this links between the different 
risks. However, it is necessary to understand that it is not possible to eliminate the 
uncertainty with political risk. The best way to manage political risk is to employ a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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holistic approach, which employs the whole range of available tools and techniques. 
One of such techniques – scenario building is going to be used in a later section of 
this research.  
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Terrorism, Separatism and Religious Extremism: Security 
Risks in Central Asia and Xinjiang 
     
 The decline of Russia’s power and influence in Central Asia has created an 
opportunity for the rise of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, known 
together as the “three evils”, in the region.  Together, they pose a potentially larger, 
destabilizing risk to the SREB than China’s power transition with Russia. Separatism 
poses an endogenous risk in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), while 
the exogenous threats of terrorism and religious extremism jeopardize the strategic 
region of Central Asia. The three are not mutually exclusive, though. Xinjiang and 
Central Asia are closely woven with a shared ethnicity, culture, and religion, which 
causes the Chinese to worry that the these shared ties will provide a conduit to spread  
“the three evils” through out the entire region, threatening peace and stability and 
endangering the success of the SREB196. The issues in Xinjiang and Central Asia are 
of crucial importance to China because unrest in these areas imperils China’s energy 
and political security as well as President Xi Jinping’s grand strategy for expanding 
China’s global role through the SREB. 
      
Central Asia is the nexus of the Chinese and Islamic worlds; which provides the new 
Silk Road project not only a route for trade and commerce, but also a corridor for the 
spread of terrorism and religious extremism. Xinjiang, which shares 2800 kilometres 
of borders with Central Asia, also shares some of the same security risks as its Central 
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Asian neighbours197. This research will analyse the domestic and regional security 
risks underpinning President Xi’s expansion of China’s global role through the SREB 
as well as assess China’s efforts to mitigate these dangers. Separatism poses a serious 
internal security risk in Xinjiang and the external risks of terrorism and religious 
fundamentalism in Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan threaten to undermine 
peace and stability in the region.  The internal security of Central Asia also poses a 
risk to China’s SREB because of conflict and instability spreads and could ultimately 
imperil the success of the SREB. These security risks include ethnic and religious 
tension, extreme poverty, drug trafficking, weak governments and the corruption that 
is rampant in the authoritarian regimes that replaced the Soviet Union. These 
conditions make the region more susceptible to terrorism and religious extremism. 
Finally, this research will analyse China’s attempts to mitigate these security risks, 
primarily through the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
      
Terrorism is a difficult subject to plug into international relations theories, which 
mainly address state actors in the international system. China just passed its first anti-
terrorism law in early 2015. Article 104 states that terrorism is any “speech or activity 
that, by means of violence, sabotage, or threat, aims to generate social panic, 
influence national policy-making, create ethnic hatred, subvert state power, or split 
the state”198199.  Terrorist activities in China include  “propagating, inciting, or 
instigating terrorism; or forming, leading or participating in an terrorist organization; 
or organizing, plotting, or implementing a terrorist action; or supporting, assisting, or 
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facilitating a terrorist organization or individual through the provision of information, 
funds, material, equipment, technologies or venues; or (e) other terrorist activities200. 
The Chinese government defines a terrorist organization as  “relatively stable criminal 
group, of at least three members, established for the purpose of carrying out terrorist 
activities; a terrorist is either a member of a terrorist organization or a person who 
carries out terrorist activities201.  China has been accused on the international stage of 
using terrorism as a justification for human rights abuses, so it is important to 
consider other definitions202.  
 
Terrorism is defined by the United States Department of Defence as “ politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups 
or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”203. The Global 
Terrorism Index specifies three criteria in order for an act to constitute terrorism: the 
incident must be intentional, it must be violent and the attackers must be sub-national 
actors204.  Several methodologies will be used to analyse the security risks SREB 
faces in Xinjiang and Central Asia. First, the power transition theory explains how 
terrorism has been able to gain a stronghold in the region, especially Central Asia. As 
the Soviet Union declined in power and influence, this created a vacuum that allowed 
the rise of fundamental religious groups such as Al Qaeda, the Taliban and The 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)205. These groups were able to gain power !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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among Muslims in the secular Central Asian states due to the population and the 
declining socioeconomic status206.  
 
These religious movements are ideational, explained in the international relations 
field as constructivism. The void created by the exit of the Soviet Union gave rise to 
new ideas and norms that have created the Islamic movement that threatens the peace 
and stability of Central Asia, Xinjiang and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. Finally, 
the social movement theory can be utilized in understanding the rise of Islamic 
movements in Central Asia. A social movement is “a collective attempt to further a 
common interest or secure a common goal through collective action outside the 
sphere of established institutions.207” In order for a group to fall under the social 
movement theory it must have a higher degree of internal organization, exist for a 
longer duration and attempt to reorganize society208. Conditions present in Central 
Asia, and to an extent in Xinjiang, provide an opening for such groups to take root 
and flourish. 
 
Central Asia Risks/Threats 
Central Asia and Xinjiang are inextricably woven together by shared history, culture, 
language and religion209. Chinese analysts keep a close watch on what happens in the 
former Soviet Republic for fear that any unrest will spread to Xinjiang. One of the 
most urgent issues facing the region now is religious extremism. It has become the 
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main driver of terrorism, according to the Global Terrorism Index 210 . The 
International Crisis Group estimates that up to four thousand Central Asians have 
been radicalized in the post-Soviet era, with Syria and ISIS inspiring Muslims to sign 
up for jihad211. Central Asia is increasingly becoming a “recruitment hub” for ISIS 
and concern over ISIS’ influence in the region increased last summer when ISIS 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi issued a clarion call asking Chinese Muslims to pledge 
allegiance to him and singled China out for jihad212. “Muslim rights are forcibly 
seized in China, India, Palestine. Your brothers all over the world are waiting or your 
rescue and are anticipating your brigades. 213  ” Al-Baghdadi’s speech was 
accompanied with a map, marking countries that ISIS plans to occupy; China was one 
of those countries214.  
 
Chinese and Central Asian leaders worry that foreign trained jihadists will return to 
Central Asia to continue their religious mandate215. Most of the countries in the region 
have a terrorism problem. Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet Republics and 
especially vulnerable. The Islamic State and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are 
operating in Tajikistan216.  President Emomali Rahmon won power in a 1997 civil war 
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against Islamists217.  In 2013, Tajik authorities arrested a group of radicals, with ties 
to Al Qaeda; they were planning a large-scale attack on government buildings218. 
Most disturbing is that the former head of Tajikistan’s Special Assignment Police 
Union defected to the Islamic state and released an Islamic propaganda video in May, 
vowing to return and wage violent jihad and calling for others to join him219.  
 
In Kazakhstan, the extremist organization Jund al-Khilofah (JAK) wants to overthrow 
Kazakh leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and establish a caliphate. And local Islamic 
insurgents from Kyrgyzstan are training in Afghanistan220. Some extremist groups are 
home-grown, and others, like Hizub ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic 
Liberation) are international. Tajikistan is the only state with a registered Islamic 
political party, Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Todjikiston (Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan 
–IRPT)221.  There are other extremist Islamic groups operating in the region, like The 
Islamic State and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and this makes the region 
vulnerable to the many factions of the Islamic State222.  Uzbekistan has problems, too. 
The country has the largest number of jihadist fighting in Syria223. The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a militant Islamic group with the goal of 
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overthrowing the Uzbek government and establishing a caliphate224.  The IMU has led 
raids in Kyrgyzstan and is credited with bombings in the Kyrgyz cities Osh and 
Bishkek 225 . The JAK, IMU, Hizub ut-Tahrir and the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) have ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda and are designated as 
terrorist organizations in all Central Asian States226. All of these groups operate in the 
Ferghana Valley, which lies in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and is 
considered the centre of  “Islamic rebirth in Central Asia.227”   
      
Of all of these groups, Hizub ut-Tahrir is the largest and most influential. It is illegal 
in all of the secular Central Asia states. Hizub ut-Tahrir is a ‘trans-national social 
movement’ and it is unique in that it eschews violence, and supports the overthrow of 
governments in Muslim states in favour of caliphates, like ISIS228 229. Hizub ut-Tahrir 
says it is not a religious party, but a political one that derives its ideology from 
Islam230. The caliphate it seeks to create is extreme, with every article of the 
constitution based on Islamic Sharia law231. “ Hizub ut-Tahrir fulfils the criteria for 
the social movement theory, it is organized in a pyramid structure, and it has been in 
existence for more than 50 years and is pushing to effect radical and religious social 
change232.  Hizub ut-Tahrir has flourished because of the conditions present in 
Tajikistan. Unemployment is high, the economy is weak, and there are few social 
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services to help the impoverished233. These conditions have created social disorder 
and political disenfranchisement that allow groups like Hizub ut-Tahrir, which 
promises free health care, to gain a following amongst Muslim populations234. It is to 
early to predict what effect Hizub ut-Tahrir will have on politics in Central Asia. So 
far, it has avoided violence. But it is possible that the strength of the group will give 
power to other, violent groups, which will affect stability in Central Asia. 
      
China has sought to quell the unrest and instability in the Central Asia region with an 
economic palliative235. China believes that creating economic opportunities and 
stability will calm the rising tides of unrest in the region and give the former Soviet 
Republic states a stake in the success of the SREB236. China has signed numerous 
deals in the area. Uzbekistan has signed a $15-billion agreement, $8-billion goes to 
Turkestan, $5-billion to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan has inked deals worth $30-billion 
with China237.  It’s too early to tell if propping the Central Asian economies up with 
trade and infrastructure deals will be successful. The theory of economic 
interdependence states that war is less likely between economically intertwined 
countries, however, it is not the countries and inter-state combat that poses the biggest 
risk in Central Asia, but transnational actors238. Lack of trust between the countries is 
a major stumbling block toward cooperation in the region239. The lack of trust can 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
233 Ibid, 4 
234 Ibid, 6 
235 Clarke, Michael (2008). ‘China’s Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia: Securing a “Silk Road” 
to Great Power Status?’ in The China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol. 6, No.2, p.100. 
236 Ibid, 100 
237 Tiezi, Shannon (2014). ‘The New Silk Road: China’s Marshal Plan’, from The Diplomat website - 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-new-silk-road-chinas-marshall-plan/ 
238 Gartzke, Erick, et al. (2001). ‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International 
Conflict’, in International Organization, Vol.55, No.2, p.392  
239 Swanstrom, Niklas (2010). ‘Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats in Central Asia: 
Connecting the New and the Old’, in China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.8, No.2, p.42 
! ! !59!
prevent countries from fully participating in the SREB initiatives, which means the 
project could fall short of its economic potential. 
 
The Influence of Pakistan and Afghanistan  
The internal security of Pakistan and Afghanistan also influences the peace and 
stability of Central Asia and ultimately affect the success of the SREB initiative and 
Chinese security. “If the security situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate 
which would result in that Central Asia would increasingly becoming a hub for 
organized crime and radical groups. Instability will increase in the region and there 
will be a growing threat of the “aforementioned” three evils spilling over into 
China.240” There had been increased concern about stability in Afghanistan as 
President Barack Obama announced plans to withdraw combat troops from the region 
by the end of last year. Airstrikes are still being launched against insurgent groups in 
Afghanistan, even with most American combat troops withdrawn from the region241.  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) combat troops have been withdrawn and 
the current NATO led mission is in Afghanistan in a support role 242. The U.S. has 
also closed all of its Central Asian military bases, including Manas Transit Centre in 
Kyrgyzstan, which was the first and last stop for American soldiers in Afghanistan.243 
Many analysts predict the departure of the western military could lead to the collapse 
of the legitimate regime and government by the Taliban244.  Afghanistan borders !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Xinjiang and the Taliban and ethnic Uyghurs already have ties, which could export 
radicalization more quickly to separatists in Xinjiang245 
      
While the Taliban has enormous influence in Pakistan, the gravest security threat 
Pakistan poses is nuclear. It is estimated that the country has 100 nuclear warheads 
and “it has the world’s fastest growing nuclear program”246. This is worrisome when 
one considers the  “anarchic regional environment” and regime instability in the 
area247. David Petraeus, former Commander of the U.S. Central Command testified 
before Congress about the potentially devastating impact of regime collapse in the 
country, “Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other 
extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven 
from which to plan and launch attacks”248. China has tried to avoid the military 
morass the U.S. found itself in and instead is using economic incentives to mitigate 
the threat potential from both Afghanistan and Pakistan. China and Pakistan are long-
time allies and President Xi signed a $46 billion energy and infrastructure deal with 
the country this April, the deal includes the sale of eight Chinese submarines to 
Pakistan249. China has also provided $327 million in aid for Afghanistan250.   
 
Again, China is seeking to create economic stability in these states to insure its own 
security. Quelling the foreign terrorist threat, they believe, will reduce the chances of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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unrest proliferating in Xinjiang. More surprisingly, in early 2015, China hosted the 
Taliban in Beijing for peace talks251. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said, “China 
supports the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process toward peace and reconciliation 
and wishes to play a constructive role to that end”252. This is an unusual move for 
Beijing, which touts “non-interference” as a key point in its foreign policy and 
supports the notion of China as a constructive regional, responsible partner. That they 
would make this gesture towards the Taliban and Afghanistan underscores the 
importance the region has on Chinese security and the SREB. 
 
Religious Extremism    
Religious extremism has been able to take root in Central Asia largely because of the 
socio-economic environment existing in the former Soviet Republics. The appeal of 
radical Islam and jihad has roots in the desire for political change253. This political 
upheaval can be construed as a constructivist change in norms. There are certain risk 
factors that make countries more vulnerable to the spread of terrorism than others.  
These factors are, “weak states, illegitimate and corrupt governments, extremist 
ideologies, historical conflict and violence, power inequality, repression by foreign 
occupation or colonial powers, ethnic or religious discrimination, social injustice, 
failure of the state to integrate dissident groups of emerging social classes and power 
external actors upholding corrupt regimes 254. Most of these conditions are present in 
the former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The area is so fractured and quixotic that the former United States National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski once called Central Asia the “Eurasian Balkans”255.  
 
None of the Central Asian states are functioning democracies and are governed by 
authoritarian leaders, some who have been in power since Soviet rule. The countries 
are riddled with traditional water, territorial and resource disputes, as well as internal 
ethnic conflict256. Kyrgyzstan has seen two regime changes in the last decade, 
including the Tulip Revolution that overthrew President Askar Akayev (this was 
funded with drug money)257258. If revolution could happen in Kyrgyzstan, it is not 
unthinkable that it could happen in other weak Central Asian states.  The Kyrgyz 
economy is dismal; the drug trade is rampant (as is organized crime) and most 
dangerous is the constant ethnic conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks259. The Uzbeks 
in Kyrgyzstan are secular, yet there is talk from the Uzbek diaspora in Central Asia of 
sending jihadists to assist in their struggle against the Kyrgyz260. Uzbekistan faces 
economic difficulties because of missteps by government officials, different tribes 
battle for influence and repression of the Islamic religion261. In 2005, government 
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troops fired on protestors, killing an estimated 187 people in what is known as the 
Andijan Massacre262. The Chinese attributed the riots on the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir.  
 
Incidents such as these are able to take root because “weak socio-political cohesion 
and internal challenges to government legitimacy of the government have lead to 
endemic political instability and in some cases, to internal military defiance of state 
structure”263. This unrest can easily spread throughout the region because of the 
ethnic, cultural and religious Diasporas throughout Central Asia. The Rand 
Corporation defines a diaspora as “immigrant communities established in foreign 
countries” and these communities are heavily motivated by ethnic ties and can play 
critical supporting roles in the struggle of other people in their clan.264 Similar 
language and religion of these ethnic Diasporas also make it easier for ISIS to recruit 
fighters in Central Asia than Pakistan or Afghanistan265.   
 
While ethnic tensions are endemic throughout Central Asia, they are most 
concentrated in the Fergana Valley. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan share 
territory in the valley.266 Most of the Fergana Valley and the population are located in 
Uzbekistan267. Almost one million Uzbeks live in Kyrgyzstan, 300,000 Kyrgyz live in 
Uzbekistan, and 1.4 million Uzbeks reside in Tajikistan. The states have economic 
issues and struggle over population, water and land rights268.  “National minorities !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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associate the faults and failures of transitional reforms with the ruling ethnic group 
and this is particularly evident in the Fergana Valley”269. The area was rife with ethnic 
tensions and irredentism even under Soviet Rule and without the Soviet Army to 
maintain peace; violent outbreaks have been more frequent. One of the most recent 
conflicts was in Osh, Kyrgyzstan in 2010, when a fight started three days of ethnic 
rioting.270 Ethnic Uzbeks accused Kyrgyzstan of attempted genocide271.   
 
Ethnic conflict further erodes these weak Central Asian states, providing a foothold 
for extremist groups to take hold. And while some of these ethnic Muslim minorities 
fight together in ISIS or Al Qaeda, there is concern that when the fighting is over in 
the Middle East, the radicals will return home and spread the insurgent movements 
through Central Asia and into Xinjiang272. The region will be more prone to this 
influence if the SREB fails to improve the economic situation in the Central Asian 
states, as poverty and political disenfranchisement give root to these terrorist and 
radical groups273. Ethnic Uzbeks have the most representation in ISIS, with a fair 
amount of fighters also hailing form Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan274.  
      
If any of these extremist groups were to succeed in establishing a caliphate, or regime 
change were to happen in one of the of these struggling countries, this would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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seriously impede the free flow of trade and people through Central Asia as well as 
western China and jeopardize trade and infrastructure deals made under the SREB 
umbrella. “The greatest security challenge for China over time will be the weakness 
of the states in Central Asia and the radicalization of those societies”275. Terrorism 
does more than just threaten the stability of the existing regime, it has economic 
repercussions, and smaller, developing nations experience more economic blowback 
than larger developed countries276. There are also direct costs; such as the amount it 
costs to rebuild bridges, railways and damaged infrastructure, and the loss of life. 
“The long term indirect costs of terrorism can be 10 to 20 times larger than the direct 
costs”277. It is difficult to determine the economic costs of terrorism in this region, as 
the authoritarian regimes are reluctant to release information that will discourage 
investors and business in the region.  
 
However, researchers have found a few consistent variables across smaller economies 
that are targeted by terrorists. The deleterious effects for terrorism on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) are greater in small, developing countries and these countries also 
have a greater loss in GDP per capita278. As the SREB encourages foreign investment 
and trade in the resource rich and developing region of Central Asia, a prolonged 
terrorist campaign could discourage foreign investors or cause existing ones to pull 
out. China has more to lose in this region than just support and participation in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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SREB. President Xi announced billions of dollars in infrastructure projects last year, 
when he launched the $40-billion Silk Road infrastructure fund279. Roads, ports and 
railways will be constructed to facilitate regional and international trade and 
investment. Billions of dollars worth of infrastructure carries massive indirect costs, 
as well. Under the best-case scenario, the projects will require millions of dollars to 
maintain, repair and guard. A favourite weapon of terrorists, the improvised explosive 
device (IED), killed thousands in Afghanistan in 2013280. The IED comprises of TNT, 
plastic explosives, metal and ball bearings, and is a super destructive and hands off 
way to destroy people and property281. 
      
Functional infrastructure also impacts another of China’s main concerns, namely 
energy security. China is the second highest energy consumer in the world and it took 
just a decade for the country to go from an economy favouring production to an 
economy favouring consumption282. China is financing billions of dollars worth of 
pipelines in Kyrgyzstan, Turkestan, and Uzbekistan to provide the oil and gas needed 
to fuel its demand283. So, terrorist activity against the energy sector could impact 
China directly by jeopardizing its access to much needed resources and at the same 
time affect the SREB by dissuading foreign investment and trade. The Chinese should 
be concerned about the security of the energy infrastructure, but so far terrorists in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan tend to concentrate high profile attacks on “Coalition 
Forces (CF) bases, military convoys, government buildings… and provincial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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leaders”284. The Central Asian security risks of terrorism and religious extremism 
have not been confined to the region, and have already spread into western China and, 
especially, Xinjiang.  
 
Separatism in Xinjiang 
Xinjiang has great geostrategic importance to the Chinese. Xinjiang is home to vast 
reserves of oil and gas, as well as China’s largest petroleum reserve, Tarim Basin. 
Feicheng oilfield is in the Xinjiang Oil Province, in the northern part of the XUAR, it 
is the largest “un-compartmentalized heavy oil reservoir ever discovered in China”285.  
      
Less than half (44 percent) of the province’s 22 million residents are Turkic speaking 
Sunni Muslims, the Uyghurs286. The Chinese have struggled with the Uyghurs and 
their separatist movement since absorbing Xinjiang into China, and the ethnic group’s 
shared religious ties with terrorists in Central Asia give cause for concern to the 
Chinese that religious extremism will spread to western China and feed the flames of 
the separatist movement.      
      
China’s biggest concern is internal security, especially in restive Xinjiang. The goal 
of maintaining domestic stability is reflected in how much money the Chinese budget 
for internal security compared to its defence budget. This amount has increased every 
year since the 2009 Urumqi riots. The 2010 security budget was $87 billion compared 
to $85 for defence, in 2011 that rose to $99 billion for security and $96 billion for 
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defence, 2012 those numbers jumped to $111 billion and  $106 billion, in 2013, they 
spent $124 billion on security and $119 billion on defence, and the defence budget for 
2104 was $132 billion – the Chinese refused to release security figure for this latest 
year, but the trend suggests it would have surpassed the defence budget 287. Even with 
the slowing Chinese economy and falling stock market, China will likely continue big 
spending on domestic security, as it needs the oil and gas to feed the economy288. The 
Chinese perceive separatist movements and radical religious groups in Xinjiang as the 
biggest threat to this security. 
      
While there are several separatist and terrorist groups, the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) is the most feared by the Chinese. The ETIM wants autonomy for 
Xinjiang’s 9-million Uyghurs. ETIM has ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, with ETIM 
separatists being trained in Taliban camps and fighting in the Afghan war289. The 
ETIM has been continuously active in terrorist activity, with attacks peaking in the 
1990’s, and the Chinese attribute the current rise in domestic violence on the 
ETIM290. Protests have become more intense in Xinjiang as radical religious groups 
have emerged in other Muslim countries291. There has been a new round of violence 
attributed to the ETIM in the past decade, particularly the Urumqi Riot in 2009.  The 
riot started at a large market when police stopped a Uyghur protest march, following 
days of ethnic tension between the ethnic group and the Han Chinese. 184 people 
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were killed in the uprising (there were likely more fatalities than the official number); 
it was the largest ethnic uprising since the Tibetan uprising in 2008292.  
 
There were numerous attacks in Xinjiang last year. In May 43 were killed when 
explosives were thrown at an Urumqi street market, in July more than 100 people 
were killed in an attack on government buildings in Yarkand county, and 33 people 
were killed in an attack on a Kunming rail station in March. Chinese authorities blame 
the Uyghur separatists for these attacks. The proliferation of groups like the ETIM 
can be linked to religious, cultural and economic persecution of the Uyghurs by the 
ruling Han293. Experts say the Chinese are only exacerbating the problem by cracking 
down on religious freedoms; children under 19 are prohibited from practicing Islam, 
religious attire is prohibited and Uyghurs are arrested for online religious activities294. 
In June, 2013, 27-people were killed in riots in Urumqi, thought to have started 
because of Chinese government sweeps and crackdowns on Uyghur men in the 
area295. These religious and separatist groups have risen up in response to the 
socioeconomic and cultural disenfranchisement of the ethnic Uyghurs 296 . Han 
Chinese rule has created the conditions that favour this resistance, and if China is to 
protect the resources and stability in the region it must make an effort to mitigate the 
problem. Eighty percent of Chinese trade with Central Asia is through Xinjiang and 
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83 percent of Xinjiang’s trade is with Central Asia297.  This could be jeopardized if 
the Uyghurs continue to push for an independent state, which China will never agree 
to. President Xi has repeatedly stated that territorial sovereignty is a ‘core interest’ of 
the Chinese state298. 
      
Conflict between the Han and Uyghurs has been endemic since the Han migration 
into Xinjiang began. However, ethnic separatism took on a new threat to national 
security when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated and the Shah of Iran 
was overthrown299.  These events caused alarm in China as leaders began to recognize 
the possible threat, external religious extremists could have in China’s western 
province300. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire shortly after intensified that 
concern; even though the Chinese no longer had to deal with Russia at it’s backdoor, 
the superpower was a stabilizing force in the region and had helped to stem the rising 
tide of religious fundamentalism in Xinjiang and Central Asia. The Arab Spring has 
also forced China to focus more attention on stopping the international threat of 
terrorism, as China has become concerned about the security of its energy supply, 
regional stability and domestic harmony301. 
 
While China has attempted to use economic incentives to maintain peace and stability 
in the Central Asian states it is also focusing on a multilateral approach, the Shanghai !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO was founded by China in 2001 to combat 
terrorism in the region and includes Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan. The main goal of the SCO is to suppress the “three evils “ of terrorism, 
separatism and extremism; the ETIM is the main target of the SCO, yet all member 
countries have citizens fighting for ISIS and fear the spread of extremism in the 
region 302 . The multilateral group has a “permanent Regional Anti-Terrorism 
Structure” (RATS) in Tashkent. Cooperative goals of the SCO “include regional 
security and the fight against terrorism, annual peace missions, military exercises 
designed to contribute to eliminating the “three evil forces” of extremism, separatism 
and terrorism”303. Cooperation is required amongst all member state in “detaining, 
extraditing and transferring suspects charged with terrorism, separatism and 
extremism”304.  
 
China and SCO states have participated in joint military exercises or “peace building 
missions” against mock terrorist threats, with the largest and most recent military 
cooperative in 2014 305.  Yet, for all of the money and support the SCO receives, it is 
little more than a paper tiger306.  Members of the SCO have signed dozens of 
multilateral agreements, with little coming of them. In 2007, members “agreed to 
establish a “unified energy market” for oil and gas exports, while also promoting 
regional development through preferential energy agreements”307. This agreement 
called for oil and gas rich members to share those resources with the states that lacked !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in them308. Eight years later this gas cartel still has not been created and experts say 
the SCO “lacks the ability” to do this309. However, member states are signing oil and 
gas deals with other countries outside of the SCO framework310. The Central Asian 
states have long resisted any sort of unification, submitting only to Soviet rule 
through “strict subordination and vertical linkages” of economic, political and public 
life311. 
 
Sovereignty is also an obstacle to the efficacy of the SCO.  Critics of the organisation 
say there is no rapid military mechanism to fight an uprising, The SCO charter 
prevents interference within member states sovereignty312. Distrust among the SCO 
member states is rampant, which is likely the reason for the non-interference policy, 
however this very policy prevents members from aiding one another if the face of a 
real threat. The 2005 Tulip Revolution demonstrates the SCO’s lack of power313. 
China and other SCO members stood by and did nothing, as the existing regime in 
Kyrgyzstan was overthrown. The SCO again demonstrated its hesitancy to act in 
Afghanistan’s domestic affairs when the Taliban rose to power. SCO leaders voiced 
concern in a joint statement, “they were unwilling to use the SCO to affect the 
security situation in Afghanistan”314. China seems uncomfortable with being an active 
political actor in such events, perhaps seeing intervention as contrary to its principle 
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of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states”315. Without real military agency 
to back up the anti-terrorism/separatism laws that have been passed, the SCO will do 
little to deter violence in Central Asia and Xinjiang.  
 
Conclusion 
The Silk Road Economic Belt is an ambitious trade and infrastructure plan that will 
help China execute its grand strategy in the Central Asian region and eventually 
linking various continents.  The success of this project is crucial for Chinese internal 
security and the continuing success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  China’s 
rapidly growing economy needs the oil and gas located in Central Asia and Xinjiang. 
It also needs peace in both regions as they act as a buffer zone between China and the 
Middle East. There are potential security threats to the success of the SREB. The East 
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) threatens internal security in the restive 
Xinjiang western region of China and terrorist and extremist groups, like ISIS and Al 
Qaeda, could significantly threaten peace and stability in Central Asia and ultimately 
derail the SREB project. Religious fundamentalism has become the biggest driver of 
terrorism and the shared religion, history and culture of Central Asia and Xinjiang 
could provide a bridge for terrorism to spread to restive Xinjiang, which already 
struggles with separatism and terrorist acts related to the movement.  
 
China also faces challenges within the very mechanism it created to help combat the 
“three evil forces” in the area. Endemic mistrust in the region affects the success of 
the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO could be the best 
means to combat the spread of the “three evils” in the area, yet it lacks a powerful !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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enforcement method and its non-interference clause prevents member states from 
truly responding to a physical threat. The Chinese must address these problems if the 
SCO is to be effective in containing terrorism, separatism and religious 
fundamentalism in the region. So far, China has undertaken the “soft diplomacy” road 
and tried to build support and consensus for the SREB with billions of dollars in aid 
and trade and infrastructure deals for participating countries. This has drawbacks, too.  
China is spending billions of dollars to develop infrastructure in Central Asia and to 
attract foreign investment to the region. This investment carries indirect costs such as 
maintenance, repairs and rebuilding if terrorists destroy structures.  But the growing 
threats of terrorism, separatism and extremism are ideological, and China will have to 
do more than spend its way out of this dilemma.  
 
China continues to throw money at Central Asian states, but that money only goes to 
the elite, who are part of the problem. China and the Central Asian states must address 
the concerns of the minority citizens who are turning to these groups out of 
hopelessness with the current political system. Uyghurs claim the Han Chinese 
restrict their religion and that the Han have a better economic situation in Xinjiang 
than the minority Uyghurs. Central Asian states are weak and corrupt, and also 
neglect the basic needs of their minority residents. These conditions give rise to 
numerous Islamic movements that want to establish a caliphate across Central Asia, 
and an Islamic caliphate would greatly jeopardize the security and success of the Silk 
Road Economic Belt in the region. 
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Scenario Building 
 
The research analysis from each section demonstrates that China’s GWS in Central 
Asia faces serious political and security threats. Successful implementation of the 
SREB initiative in Central Asia depends on the ability of Chinese decision makers to 
make long-term strategic decisions, which will manage these risks. However, the 
multifaceted nature of these hazards, coming on three different levels, requires the 
consideration of a vast number of outcomes the probability of which can’t be 
quantified. Thus, the outcomes lie in the realm of uncertainty316, an environment 
where the future is unknowable317. But, even though it is impossible to predict the 
future outcomes, influenced by many interconnected variables, it doesn’t mean that 
they can’t be anticipated. 
 
To reduce uncertainty and prepare strategies for a plethora of possible outcomes it is 
necessary to apply a technique that can consider a range of possible alternative 
futures, instead of concentrating on single prediction. The process of scenario 
building achieves a level of anticipation by modelling plausible outcomes 318 . 
Although scenario building is widely used by businesses, government agencies and 
NGOs, the field is still in the process of development with no single prominent 
theory319. It was first successfully applied by the oil giant Royal Dutch Shell, during 
the turbulent 1970s to mitigate different threats, coming from an unstable 
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international environment320. American and French scholars such as Herman Kahn 
and Michel Godet have further developed the theoretical base321. 
 
This research project will employ scenario-building technique to “represent the future 
and clarify present action in the light of possible and desirable outcomes”322. To 
achieve this goal the potential events are constructed into scenarios where “plausible 
futures are gathered to challenge current thinking”323, while “illogical and non-
plausible situations are rejected” 324 . Traditionally scenario building requires 
considerable resources both in terms of time and manpower325. In such cases a team 
can prepare scenarios for a period of time between 12 and 18 months326. This research 
project however is limited in terms of resources available. Therefore to build 
scenarios that are still both “credible and useful to the decision-makers”327 it is 
necessary to acknowledge these existing constraints and concentrate on a specific 
number of scenarios, using a limited number of hypotheses for each of them328. 
 
Scholars identify two different types of scenarios – normative and exploratory. 
Normative scenarios are applied when it is necessary to anticipate the most plausible 
positive and negative outcomes, taking into account the relationship between the 
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object and the subject of scenario building329. Exploratory scenarios are used to 
project the most likely future outcomes based upon the past and present trends330. 
This research is going to construct three different scenarios, two of them normative 
and one exploratory. For the normative scenarios two alternative worlds will be 
assessed, demonstrating possible positive and negative outcomes for China’s GWS 
respectively. The exploratory scenario will present the most probable outcomes, based 
on the conducted research. To use available resources with a high level of efficiency, 
each scenario will be based on a number of hypotheses and limitations, establishing 
the theoretical framework of the analysis. 
 
The construction of a scenario includes five steps: defining the included and excluded 
variables, stating major stakeholders, establishing the timeframe, and finally 
formulating the hypotheses relevant to each scenario331. The included variables that 
are considered in each scenario are divided in two types: endogenous and exogenous. 
Endogenous variables include features that are contained in the region. Exogenous 
variables are features that originate outside the region but may impact the internal 
ones. Endogenous variables constitute the following: regional Great Power rivalry, 
regional politics, domestic politics in the Central Asian states, societal tensions (i.e. 
ethnic differences, factional differences), and terrorism in Central Asia. Exogenous 
variables are security trends in the Middle East, geopolitical situation in Asia Pacific 
and Europe. For the purposes of simplicity each scenario has to define the excluded 
variables, the value of which is assumed to be constant for the whole timeframe of the 
scenarios. These constant variables are domestic developments in China, Russia, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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political stability in South Asia, and the stability of the global economy without a 
major financial crisis and the absence of full-scale armed conflict between Russia, 
China and the United States. 
 
The stakeholders for each scenario are China, Russia, the United States, all the 
countries in the region (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan), major non-state actors, such as Islamic terrorist groups (the JAK, 
Hizub ut-Tahrir, IMU) and ethnic separatist groups (East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement), and local ethnic communities. Considering the timeframe, it is important 
to emphasise that the goals stated in China’s Grand Westward Strategy are long-term. 
However, for the purposes of this analysis the timeframe is fifteen years. This time 
period has been established to illustrate the dynamics of power transition in the 
region, which are inexorable because the majority of the leaders are over 70 years of 
age.  
 
Normative Scenarios 
The two normative scenarios concern the positive and negative political and security 
developments in Central Asia for the next 15 years. The object for these two scenarios 
is China and its economic focused grand strategy. The subjects that influence the state 
of the object are the three levels of political and security threats, and their interactions 
are elaborated upon to influence the effect on China’s strategy. Additionally, each 
subject on each level has a formulated hypothesis, which is based upon the context of 
the scenario, whether negative or positive.  
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Negative Scenario 
This scenario seeks to outline all the plausible negative interactions and outcomes that 
could lead to the failure of China’s initiatives. The hypotheses are as follows: For the 
great powers, Russia sees increasing Chinese presence in the region as a major threat, 
and the United States is actively attempts to contain China’s influence in the region. 
The regional political risks among the five states in Central Asia are dominated by 
instability due to domestic and structural pressures. Lastly, the security threat of 
terrorism will be an explosion of uncontrollable activity. The structure of the scenario 
will be level based, starting from the structural level and working down towards the 
individual and non-state actor level. Conclusively, the scenario will have highlighted 
key developments in the region that will negatively impact China’s SREB strategy in 
Central Asia and lead to severely reducing its likelihood of success. 
 
Among the great powers, the dominant feature is suspicion. The most active opponent 
to Chinese ambitions will be Russia. From a Russian point of view, China’s 
increasing ambitions and achievements will cause Russia to view China as a threat to 
Russian influence, and the events in Ukraine echo this332. The most prominent 
country that will face this political feud between Russia and China will be 
Kazakhstan333. The tool that Russia will deploy to irritate and dissuade Chinese 
ambitions will be its influence at both the government and societal levels, which 
stems from its shared history in the region334, as well as similar political governments, 
culture and ethnicity. At the government levels, Russia will discourage local leaders 
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to cooperate with China. Both China and Russia will competitively support factions 
within the Central Asian states’ polity335. Russia historical and security relationship in 
Central Asia will be its advantage. Over the years this rivalry will become more open 
and pronounced. Within society, Russia will use its advantage of cultural ethnic links 
to agitate anti-Chinese sentiment in the local ethnic communities across the region336. 
Russian companies will aggressively compete with Chinese companies for energy 
infrastructure projects. Militarily, Russia will strive to arm its CSTO allies to solidify 
its firm sphere of influence. Within regimes that will collapse, such as Kazakhstan, 
Russia will unilaterally deploy troops to secure its interests. Kazakhstan has ethnic 
Russians337 and this provides a claim similar to Russia’s current claims in the 
Crimea338. As regional tensions rise, Russia will look to support and arm their 
supported political factions and ethnic groups who will fight for power in their 
respective politically destabilised countries. Lastly, all existing multilateral 
organisations that contain both Russia and China will be highly problematic for 
China, since Russia will block Chinese initiatives. 
 
The United States is similar to Russia in its strategy, but less aggressively motivated. 
The United States’ motivation in Central Asia would derive from its China 
containment and pivot to Asia policies339. As political stability deteriorates in the 
region, the United States will seek the opportunity to support factions in countries that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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are more politically responsive to the United States. The most prominent target will 
be Uzbekistan, because of its relationship to the U.S. during the war in 
Afghanistan340. The United States may even attempt to support and force a regime 
change in Uzbekistan. A U.S. supported regime change is plausible based upon the 
U.S.’ experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran341.  In conjunction with the U.S.’ 
political efforts to contain China, the United States will seek to reverse the withdrawal 
of combat troops342 and provide actual containment through deploying a military 
presence in the increasing power vacuum region. The U.S. military presence and arms 
sales will reinforce an active security dilemma between the three main great powers 
and the regional powers. Additionally, as terrorist return to the region from their 
campaigns in the Middle East, the United States will use its global war on terror 
policy to justify its intervention into certain countries affairs, even militarily or 
covertly. All of these moves by the United States will severely affect China’s 
ambitions and its desire to successfully build a healthy SREB, because of the intense 
competition with both Russia and the United States. 
 
Regional politics are the crux of this scenario, because they will be the trigger that 
intensifies great power rivalry and terrorist security threats. The eventual power 
vacuum will result because the septuagenarian leaders343 in Central Asia will leave no 
adequate power successor. Consequently, with the death of the leaders, domestic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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political rivalry will ensue among factions and ethnicities and stability will be 
affected344. Kazakhstan is the most influential example and its political turmoil will be 
embroiled by Sino-Russian competition that will fuel power competition. It is 
increasingly likely that Russia and China will use military force to secure their 
interests. Domestic political tensions and conflicts will encourage ethnic tensions and 
conflicts. Conflict among ethnicities in different countries will reinforce regime 
collapse, leading to a scenario similar to the ethnic conflicts in the Middle East, such 
as Lebanon and Syria. Prominent ethnic tensions will become cross-border issues that 
will add to the likelihood of inter-state war345. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
are the countries most likely to engage in an inter-state conflict because of endemic 
ethnic strife over territory and water resources346. As domestic stability declines, 
Chinese labour in these countries will be targeted. Anti-Chinese sentiment will be 
stirred up externally by Russia and internally by factions scapegoating China347. This 
will lead to Chinese nationals who are working on SREB projects348 to be targeted 
and China’s military intervention will become necessary for the protection of its 
interests and citizens, like it did in Yemen and Libya349. This will further diminish 
China’s image in the region and it will have to focus a lot of its political, economic 
and military power into containing the destabilising power situation. 
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As a consequence of the political and security turmoil, a foothold for terrorism will be 
highly likely. The events in the Middle East, whether positive or negative, will mean 
that extremist fighters that have been fighting in the region for other organisations, 
such as ISIS or al-Qaeda350, will be return to Central Asia. The export of radical Islam 
and terrorism from the Middle East is high likely given regional instability. Returning 
terrorists will be able to seize territory in various countries and establish a movement 
that can sweep region wide. Central Asia will then become a viable terrorist 
expansionist area, and funding from Middle Eastern organisations and opiate funded 
organisations351 will lead to an explosion of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist activities 
across the region. In conjunction with the rise of Islamic terrorism, ethnic terrorist and 
state sponsored separatists will also have foothold. Ethnic terrorists in the diverse 
countries of the region will fight for control of their own territory and rights. Both 
ethnic terrorists and separatist groups would be funded or supported by any of the 
three great powers in the region. This explosion of terrorist ideals and activities will 
find its way to Xinjiang and China will be forced to assign a lot of its resources352 to 
prevent separation and maintain stability.  
 
In conclusion the outlook for the political and security situation in Central Asia is 
dominated by instability and conflict. After 15 years there is aggressive competition 
among the great powers and an increasing power vacuum due to turbulent power 
transitions in Central Asia. There are many domestic civil conflicts, which are 
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factional and ethnic based. Inter-state conflicts are embroiled with intra-state 
conflicts. Anti-Chinese sentiment is high and its interests are severely damaged. 
China has pulled out its citizens. Terrorist organisations have grown uncontrollably. 
The regional economy is in ruins. The continuation of the SREB initiative is no longer 
viable and China has switched its strategy to containment of the threats, especially 
terrorism. Ultimately, the initiative is aborted at its worst or indefinitely suspended 
until there is a resolution.  
 
Positive Scenario 
The second normative scenario will an opposite alternative reality, in which the SREB 
initiative after 15 years is a success due to favourable outcomes influenced by internal 
and external variables. The hypotheses employed for the construction of the scenario 
are the following: Concerning great powers, Russia cooperates with China on a wide 
variety of issues, while the United States does not possess the interest or the 
capabilities to counter Chinese interests in the region. On the regional level the 
situation remains stable, supported by major economic improvements, brought about 
by the SREB. In terms of security, no single or group of actors are capable of 
seriously challenging China’s interests in the region. The structure of the scenario will 
follow the same pattern as the previous one. As a conclusion, the scenario is going to 
present an overview of the situation in the region after 15 years from now. 
 
On the great power politics level, Russia will actively cooperate with China while its 
relations with the West remain tense. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) led by 
Russia will be dynamically integrated into the SREB initiative in accordance with the 
agreements package signed by Xi Jingping and Vladimir Putin on the 8th of May 2015 
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in Moscow.353 Thus, Russia will align its strategic goals in the region with those of 
China, giving a further impulse for the development of the strategic partnership 
between the two countries in political, economic and cultural spheres. Moscow will 
use its influence in Central Asia to promote the development of the SREB and secure 
the investment from China into its own infrastructure. In return Russia will increase 
its security cooperation with China within the framework of the SCO.354 
 
The United States will not have any significant military presence in the region, after 
the withdrawal from Afghanistan355, closure of its last military base in Central Asia356 
and deteriorating relations with some of the local leaders 357 . The increasing 
geopolitical pressures in the Middle East358, Europe359 and the necessity to engage 
China in East Asia will draw the United States’ attention away from Central Asia. To 
protect its interest the United States will have to focus its political and economic 
resource in these key areas. Local opposition groups in Central Asian states will face 
a decreasing level of funding, which will lead to their marginalization on the domestic 
political arena. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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At the regional level, the stability of Central Asia will rest on Sino-Russian 
cooperation within the SCO.360 This strategic partnership in turn will ensure smooth 
power transitions in Central Asian states, similar to the one that took place in 
Turkmenistan in 2014.361 New leaders, eager to boost their legitimacy and solidify 
power, will want to improve economic conditions and thus welcome Chinese 
investment, brought by the SREB. Aligning their goals with those of the Chinese 
SREB initiative in Central Asia, local leaders will gain access to a major source of 
funding, which in turn will help to alleviate social tensions and lower anti-Chinese 
sentiments of local populations. A closer cooperation within the SCO will lead to its 
increasing role in the prevention of potential wars and intra-state conflicts. 362 
Increasing wealth and the creation of a regional identity will bring a region-wide 
understanding that multilateral cooperation is a strategic goal for the region’s 
development. 
 
Considering security, the combination of economic prosperity and political stability 
will seriously reduce the level of radicalism and negatively affect terrorists’ foothold 
in the region. The growing cooperation within the SCO anti-terrorist structure, which 
will include joint training and counterterrorism operations, intelligence sharing and 
increased interoperability of equipment, will effectively curb terrorist activity and 
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prevent the formation of large radical groups.363 While the Middle East will remain 
the nexus of international Islamic terrorism in the next 15 years364, local groups in 
Central Asia would face a lack of funding and an increasingly effective combination 
of active oppression and improving economic conditions, the same strategy Chinese 
government is applying in the Xinjiang province.365  
 
Concluding the scenario, the following describes the situation in Central Asia in 15 
years from now. Favourable geopolitical conditions ensure Russia’s cooperation in 
the region, while the level of interference from the United States remains limited. 
Sino-Russian cooperation through the regional multilateral structure – the SCO has 
ensured smooth regime transitions in Central Asian states and successfully managed 
potential conflicts between regional states. Political support from the new local 
leaders has created optimal conditions for the SREB’s rapid growth and development. 
The initiative generates great amount of wealth, which in combination with the 
substantially improved infrastructure have created favourable economic conditions for 
all the layers of Central Asian states’ societies and improved standards of living. 
Regional power stability and dynamic economic development coupled with efficient 
counterterrorism mechanisms have managed to suppress the activity of local religious 
and ethnic terrorist groups. After 15 years, there is a region-wide agreement on the 
viability of the SREB initiative. The successful modernisation of the transport !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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infrastructure and a dramatic increase in the volume of trade in Central Asia create a 
solid basis for the SREB’s continuous expansion over the Eurasian landmass. 
 
Exploratory Scenario 
The third scenario is an exploratory one and seeks to illustrate the most possible 
outcomes based upon the research. The hypotheses for this scenario are as follows: 
Russia will cooperate with China in the economic sphere, but will retain its regional 
influential status as the key security provider. The United States will be involved in 
great power rivalry with China, but the U.S. presence in Central Asia will remain 
marginal. Central Asian states will face increasing instability that is caused by 
international structural and domestic pressures. Terrorist activity will increase in the 
region to reflect the global trend and will cause a tighter Sino-Russian cooperation 
with Central Asian states in the SCO. Conclusively, the region will have undergone a 
minor turbulent transition because of increased terrorist activity and regime changes. 
However, Sino-Russian cooperation will manage these developments and the SREB 
will be firmly established. 
 
The relationship between Russia and China will be a major contributing factor to the 
development of the SREB in Central Asia. Russia’s confrontational relationship with 
West will continue to affect its economy. As a consequence, it will increasingly rely 
upon China as a source of capital366. A resurgent Russian foreign policy will utilize its 
economic, political and cultural links to secure its interests367. Likewise, China’s 
economic foreign policy in Central Asia will increase its influence in the region. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
366 Gabuev, Alexander (2015). ‘A “Soft Alliance”? Russia-China Relations after the Ukraine Crisis’, 
Report from European Council on Foreign Relations, p. 10 
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balance within the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership will be critical. Russia will 
view challenging powers as an encroachment upon its traditional sphere of 
influence368. Therefore Russia will seek to maintain its power parity with China by 
positioning itself as the key security provider in the region369. The struggle against 
terrorism will be a unifying feature for Russian CSTO influence and will be the 
justification for Russian military operations in the region370. Although the ‘Stans’ will 
face destabilising power transitions, Russia’s security grip and intervention will 
prevent radical and spiralling instability from occurring. China’s economic influence 
and Russia’s military might will balance power in the region. Their relationship will 
remain within the strategic partnership framework, which is based upon mutual 
pragmatic goals “and are not always underwritten by shared values in a way typical of 
more entrenched alignments”371. Russian initiatives, such as the EEU and the CSTO 
will increase its strategic economic and security position372 in the region over the next 
15 years. Although Russia has its own initiatives, the pull factors of creating 
infrastructural and economic links with other parts of Asia through Central Asia will 
mitigate rivalry, and both China and Russia will accommodate their interests and 
spheres of influence. Russia has a large stake in the evolution of the SREB and the 
economic and political transformation of the region.  
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Sino-U.S. relations will continue to fluctuate between cooperation and confrontation. 
The next 15 years of U.S. foreign policy will not place Central Asia high on its 
priority lists. The structural and domestic features of Central Asia will keep the 
United States from increasing its influence and activity. There are limited U.S. allies 
in the region and it will be increasingly difficult for the United States to gain allies, 
because of the historical, cultural, economic and political differences. Uzbekistan is 
the most likely to favour U.S. support. Their relationship will not be based upon 
opposing China’s initiative, but on challenging Russia’s influence373. Kyrgyzstan, a 
former U.S. partner, will move more towards the Russian sphere of influence374. The 
United States’ interests in the region will be focused on counterterrorism, free-market 
economic growth, democracy and human rights375. Russia and China will assume 
leadership of anti-terrorist measures in Central Asia, while the U.S.’ counterterrorism 
focus will be in the Middle East. The U.S.’ economic initiative through Afghanistan 
has been unfruitful and the counter-initiatives of China’s SREB and Russia’s EAEU 
will solidify a Sino-Russian sphere of influence. Likewise, the importance and shared 
political identity of Central Asia with China and Russia will tighten the authoritarian 
narrative in Central Asia and deter democratic change when the power transition 
occurs. Therefore, the United States’ political, economic and security interests will be 
focused in Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East respectively.  
 
The autocratic nature of the local regimes creates a serious risk of a power vacuum. In 
the three most populous states, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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authoritarian leaders have been in power since the early 1990s376. Due to the poor 
quality of political institutions the inevitable power transition will destabilise the 
region by exacerbating political and ethnic divisions377. There are two previous 
examples of power transition in the region (Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) that 
illustrate the possible future outcomes for the three other states. In the case of 
Turkmenistan, the change was a result of an internal power struggle, but occurred in a 
very smooth manner 378 , while Kyrgyzstan was turbulent, but with Russian 
involvement the situation quickly stabilized, thus avoiding the full-scale collapse379. 
Therefore, the power transitions in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the next 
15 years will most likely follow one of the two patterns. To prevent them from sliding 
into serious instability China and Russia will cooperate. 
 
The SCO will play an important role in the prevention of intra and inter-state 
conflicts380. The combination of the SREB and the SCO will stimulate the foundation 
of a shared regional identity. The issue with local anti-Chinese sentiment will be 
addressed through improving the policies of Chinese companies. Even though the 
potential impact of this risk is medium, the reputational costs for China can be quite 
high. Thus, as the African experience has demonstrated, Chinese companies will be 
able to employ the necessary risk mitigation techniques381. The government will 
exercise a tighter control over the companies involved into the construction of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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SREB infrastructure and force them to invest money into the risk mitigation 
strategies, since their costs would be marginal in comparison with the costs of the 
whole project. 
 
The security threat posed by terrorism will continue to increase, due to a spill over 
effect from the Middle East. Regardless of the fate of the Islamic State, many Central 
Asian extremists are going to return to their home countries. They will bring radical 
Islam, and substantial military experience and tactics, from the Middle East into 
Central Asian Muslim societies. Furthermore the diminished U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan will lead to a security relapse and will act a bridge for terrorist activities 
in Central Asia. Facing oppression by local authoritarian regimes382, these radicals 
will seize every opportunity to destabilise the region. 
 
Local regimes strongly monitor and control the freedoms of Muslim people in Central 
Asia. It is this religious suppression, as well as the socio-economic conditions and 
inequalities in the countries that will metastasize terrorist ideals383. The societal focus 
of terrorism will be on minorities and those disenfranchised by Central Asian regimes. 
The Fergana Valley will likely be a key point for terrorism, since there is a high 
number of minorities from other neighbouring countries and their alienation and poor 
well-being will lead to political and religious tensions, making radical Islam a viable 
ideology against the oppressive leaders.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
382 Eurasianet (2015). ‘Kyrgyzstan: Authorities Present Their Case for Claimed IS Cell’, from 
Eurasianet.org website - http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74326 
383 Chausovsky, Eugene (2012). ‘Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism’, from 
Stratford Global Intelligence website - https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/militancy-central-asia-more-
religious-extremism  
 
! ! !93!
The crucial countermeasure to this challenge will be Sino-Russian cooperation in 
Central Asia. Both countries have experienced separatism and Islamic terrorism and 
will be determined to combat it by uniting forces within the SCO. Although Central 
Asian states will face a rise in terrorist activity, Xinjiang’s situation will largely 
remain the same, due to the high level of suppression from the Chinese government. 
The strong feature of autocracy and hard government will be both a stabilising and 
destabilising feature against terrorism. Russia, China and the five Central Asian states 
share the value of strong government, state-society links and oppose terrorism. The 
great powers will use organisations, such as the SCO and the CSTO as instruments for 
their anti-terrorist activates, especially in the case of Russia. 
 
Conclusively, Central Asia will face an increasing instability and to secure its 
interests and the future of the SREB initiative China will rely upon mutual 
cooperation with local elites and its strategic partnership with Russia. After 15 years, 
the region has undergone a period of minor turbulence and with the new leaders 
securely in power Chinese interest are secured in short and medium term perspectives. 
The political and security situation in Central Asia are characterised by the dynamics 
in Sino-Russian bilateral relations. The U.S. intervention has been negligible due to 
its focus on other parts of the world. The multilateral cooperation among the 
stakeholders in the region is focused on economic development and conflict 
mitigation. The threat of terrorism is still present and deeper ethnic and religious 
tensions remain supressed. The SREB initiative is firmly in place, with new 
infrastructure projects completed and substantial increase in the volume of trade. 
China’s win-win cooperation vision is shared among the local states as well as Russia, 
and the SREB serves as an impulse for further economic integration in Central Asia. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Silk Road Economic Belt is a project of an unprecedented scale, which seeks to 
transform the economic realities for the whole continent and solidify China’s position 
as a focal point of the global trade flows. The history of European colonialism 
established the pattern of maritime trade, and likewise China’s coastal provinces have 
benefitted immensely from global trade. However, this has created serious imbalances 
in the development and wealth between eastern and western provinces. Since the turn 
of the century Beijing has been developing its western regions trying to diversify its 
economy and redistribute the wealth in society. Additionally the Chinese economy 
requires energy security, to ensure its uninterrupted growth. To facilitate these 
domestic policy goals the SREB initiative seeks to dramatically increase the volume 
of trade overland to the western markets and create a stable energy supply channel. 
Therefore Central Asia is a crucial link in the implementation of the strategy.  
 
However, the political and security threats associated with Central Asia are numerous. 
Historically the region has been an arena for great power competition. The turbulent 
local politics, driven by tribal power struggles and soviet totalitarian heritage has 
created rigid authoritarian structures capable of oppressing separatist tendencies and 
ethnic conflicts. Yet in the long run such structures are not sustainable and face an 
inherent risk of regime collapse due to its undeveloped political and economic 
institutions. In addition to the volatile political situation in these countries, the region 
is highly exposed to the security threat of terrorism, fuelled by Islamic 
fundamentalism and separatism. Both these political risks and security threats have to 
be managed for the successful development of the SREB and require cooperation 
! ! !95!
among the actors. This research project has sought to identify and analyse these risks 
and threats on three levels, which are structural, national and individual. 
 
The structural analysis focused on an assessment of the capabilities and incentives of 
Russia and the United States to impact China’s interests. Russia has considerable 
capabilities in Central Asia to exert influence against China’s interests, however it 
does not have the incentive. The Russian historical and cultural links, as well as the 
continued political, economic and military ties, gives it an advantage over other great 
powers in the region in dealing with Central Asian states. Russian incentives are not 
to compete with China, but to cooperate, since Russia will benefit from the economic 
success of the initiative. Therefore Russia’s activity in the region will increase in 
tandem with China’s activities. Alternatively, the United States’ capabilities have 
decreased since it has pulled out of Afghanistan, and closed its military bases in 
Central Asia states. Although China and the United States are in competition with one 
another, the U.S. incentive to disrupt China’s strategy in Central Asia is low because 
its foreign policy objectives are focused elsewhere. On the regional level there are a 
number of political risks. These risks are: the possibility of regime collapse in a 
country, the possibility of inter-state war and the eruption of anti-Chinese sentiment 
among local populations, all of which have different probabilistic and potential 
impacts. The most serious risk to the SREB initiative is a regime collapse in the one 
of the Central Asian states, which has both high level of probability and impact. In 
terms of security impact of non-state actors Central Asia is going to witness a rise of 
terrorist activity, fuelled by the radical developments in the Middle East spreading to 
the region. The autocratic nature of Central Asian regimes will facilitate the growth of 
terrorism. To fight this threat China will seek to strengthen its anti-terrorist measures 
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and establish a deeper multilateral cooperation with Central Asian states and Russia. 
The evolution of the SCO into an effective tool is necessary to combat this threat. 
 
The complexity of the threats on the three different levels creates a high level of 
uncertainty. The success of the SREB initiative depends on the ability of Chinese 
decision makers to anticipate a wide range of possible outcomes and prepare 
mitigation strategies for each of them. The three scenarios have sought to outline this 
range of plausible outcomes. Every scenario represents a plausible alternative reality, 
based on a number of hypotheses. Thus the future developments in Central Asia may 
include a variety of outcomes from the three scenarios.  
 
With the sufficient level of anticipation of existing political and security threats and 
possible outcomes, China can favourably manage the variables across the three levels, 
based on the analysis. Nevertheless, there are foreseen and unforeseen variables that 
have not been included in the main research and the limited number of variables used 
for scenario building negates further study of their impact to China’s initiative. One of 
the main factors that needs to be examined, is the economical development in the 
region and its forecasted growth in the next 15 years. Other areas for further study 
may include an analysis of additional stakeholders such as India, Pakistan and Japan 
would create a more comprehensive understanding of the structural level. A closer 
study of socio-cultural developments in Central Asian states would shed light on the 
ideational and cultural possibility for regional cooperation and integration in the 
future. A study of current state of domestic politics and foreign policy formation 
processes in China and Russia may also provide an invaluable insight into the 
evolution of their foreign policy goals. 
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